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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines intelligence strategies that law enforcement officials may 
use to combat transnational Islamic terrorism in the United States.  Many of the concepts 
discussed in this thesis come from U.S. Intelligence Community approaches.  Others are 
familiar to both intelligence and law enforcement professionals.  The thesis focuses on 
Islamic terrorism, most notably promoted and conducted by al-Qa’eda, though a number 
of the techniques can apply to other terrorist threats.  The religious foundations of Islamic 
terrorism and the milieu in which it flourishes provides both a strategic and tactical 
backdrop for what has been cast as a global jihad—a violent, worldwide religious 
campaign with political objectives.  The unique ethnic and religious characteristics also 
present specific challenges for law enforcement intelligence operations, most notably in 
collecting human intelligence.  Processing collected threat intelligence and developing 
defensive plans require a broad, multi-layered strategy to be successful in meeting the 
challenges posed by a geographically pervasive terrorist threat.  As this thesis argues, 
local jurisdictions must work in tandem with national-level organs to create an effective 
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GLOSSARY 
agent   1. n., (in context of police roles) law enforcement officer in plain  
   clothes, such as a federal agent or detective 
   2. n., (Intelligence Community term) a recruited human source of  
   Information 
 
analyst  n., one who analyzes raw intelligence to put it in context and  
   derive meaning from it; produces finished intelligence.  (Also used  
   in context of police roles.) 
 
analytics  n., computerized analytical algorithms 
 
asabiya  (Arabic) n., tribal or group loyalty 
 
asset   n., (intelligence term) a recruited source of information;   
   synonymous with agent    
 
Caliphate  (derived from Arabic) n., the unified Islamic Nation, governed by  
   one leader (the Caliph) who commands political and religious  
   authority with God’s (Allah’s) blessing 
    
confidential  
          informant  (police term) n., one who provides information to police and whose 
   identity is protected 
 
data mining  n., cross-referencing data elements to discern patterns, links and  
   associations among them 
 
detached associate n., person from whom terrorist(s) depend on for some measure of  
   routine service or support (grocer, cleric, landlord, etc.), but who  
   may not necessarily endorse the terrorist agenda 
 
finished intelligence n., intelligence that has been analyzed and interpreted 
 
halal   (Arabic) n., Islamic dietary strictures; adj., of or relating to halal 
 
HUMINT  n., acronym for human intelligence, or intelligence derived from  
   human sources of information 
 
imam   (Arabic) n., local Muslim cleric 
 
indicator  n., (intelligence term) something observable that will likely occur  
   as a stage in a developing incident or scenario 
 xiv
 
indication  n., (intelligence term) occurrence that has already happened that  
   fits into an indicator category 
 
Islamism   (derived from Arabic) n., a political ideology in which Islam  
   should be universally applied to all facets of society, from personal  
   religious practices to government and politics 
 
Islamist  (derived from Arabic) adj., of or relating to Islamism; n., one who 
   ascribes to an Islamist ideology 
 
 
jihad   (Arabic) n., religious struggle; sometimes used for “holy war” 
 
jihadi   (Arabic) adj., of or relating to jihad; n., one who endorses or  
   engages in violent jihad; generally used in reference to radical  
   activists1 
 
jihadist  (derived from Arabic) adj., relating jihad as a political ideology;  
   n., one who ascribes to jihad as a political ideology 
 
mujahed   (Arabic) n., holy warrior, singular (similar to jihadi, but used to  
   denote a soldier in war)  
 
mujahedin  (Arabic) n., plural of mujahed 
 
mukhtar  (Arabic) n., “the elected one,” elder who serves as the de facto  
   leader of a traditional Arab community 
 
modus operandi (Latin) n., method of operations.  Also known by its acronym MO.  
 
network link   n., a connection or relation between two given network nodes 
 
network member n., a witting, bona fide member of a terrorist network 
 
network node   n., an individual or entity (such as a terrorist cell) in a network 
 
open contact  n., one who provides information to police openly without the need 
   for confidentiality 
 
patrolman   (in context of police roles) n., uniformed patrol officer 
 
 
                                                 
1 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005), p. 330. 
 xv
proximal outsider n., person tangentially affiliated with suspected terrorists, or who is  
   in close proximity to them 
 
salaf   n., the Prophet Muhammad and his first generation of disciples 
 
Salafi   (Arabic) adj., of or relating to form of Islamic fundamentalists  
   practice predicated on an adherence to a lifestyle emulating that if  
   the salaf; n., one who professes to Salafi form of Islam 
 
Salafism  (derived from Arabic) n., a religious and political ideology   
   founded on Salafi Islam 
 
Salafist  (derived from Arabic) adj., of or relating to the ideology of   
   Salfism; n., one who follows Salafist ideology 
 
 
sharia   (Arabic) n., Islamic law 
 
source   1. n., a source of information 
   2. (law enforcement term) v., to recruit or employ someone as a  
   source; to manage a collection operation using sources, commonly  
   called sourcing 
 
source access   n., describes the kind of information a source can routinely obtain  
   on terrorists or terrorist activity 
 
source placement  n., situation or physical location that affords a source access to  
   information about terrorists or terrorist activity 
 
surveil   v., (police and intelligence term) to conduct surveillance 
 
surveillant  n., (police and intelligence term) one who conducts surveillance;  
   member of a surveillance team  
 
umma   (Arabic) n., the “community of the faithful,” the global Muslim  
   community 
 
unassociated  
 observer n., person who lives or works in a location from which he may  
   observe pre-operational terrorist preparation, such as target   
   surveillance or supply acquisition, but is not expected to have  
   direct contact with terrorists 
 
 xvi
zakat   (Arabic) n., Islamic charitable contributions (similar in principle to 
   Christian tithing, but traditionally mandated at 2.5 percent of one’s  
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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE  
This thesis examines possible government options in response to Islamist 
transnational terrorist activity in the United States.  The objective is to illuminate what 
intelligence techniques domestic law enforcement officials may employ to increase their 
effectiveness.   
The overall question that this thesis seeks to answer is: What intelligence 
techniques should domestic law enforcement officials apply to thwart Islamist 
transnational terrorism?  A subset of questions, from general to specific, includes: 
• What indicators do terrorist activities present? 
• How might law enforcement officials best observe those indicators? 
• What techniques do intelligence organizations employ that law 
enforcement may use or modify to suit their own operations? 
B. CONTEXT 
How can law enforcement officials use intelligence to curb or prevent Islamist 
terrorist activity in the United States?  A handful of authors have put forward “street-
level” techniques, such as the use of informants and open contacts2 or the employment of 
pre-operational attack indicators,3 though not in a comprehensive format related to law 
enforcement intelligence. These few publications notwithstanding, most proposed 
intelligence-related solutions tend to aim at national policy or the strategic level, with 
little concrete, tactical advice for law enforcement professionals.  Writings on 
intelligence related to terrorism fail to consider the law enforcement dimension in 
significant depth.4  A study of general concepts in intelligence, however, can enhance the 
                                                 
2 Cliff Mariani, Terrorism Prevention and Response: The Definitive Law Enforcement Guide to 
Prepare for Terrorist Activity, 2nd Edition (New York, NY: Looseleaf Law Publications, Inc., 2004), pp. 
126-133; A Law Enforcement Guide to Understanding Islamist Terrorism (Baton Rouge, LA: First Capital 
Technologies, LLC., 2003), pp. 67-80. 
3 Ibid., pp. 19-21, 100-104, 110-111. 
2 
formulation of both strategic and tactical intelligence applications for police antiterrorism 
programs, particularly in the areas of collection strategies, analysis processes and asset 
protection measures.  The geographically pervasive threat of Islamist terrorism 
necessitates a layered, multi-echelon response, such that the intelligence tools presented 
in the thesis should be integrated into a cohesive, national effort.  This is especially true 
in the realm of intelligence analysis and risk assessment, where independent, 
uncoordinated efforts by multiple local jurisdictions will fall short of meeting the threat. 
C. BACKGROUND ON ISLAMIST TERRORIST METHODOLOGY 
The thesis addresses specific strategies and methodologies of the Islamist terrorist 
threat, in order to delimit the scholarly focus to this subset of transnational terrorism.  Al-
Qa’eda has assumed the mantle of a global Islamist jihad, acting as the vanguard of a 
protracted campaign against the West.  It promulgates a strategic vision, as well as 
tactical direction and education, to its geographically distributed affiliates, greatly aided 
by the Internet.  By sharing a common vision and exchanging tactical practices, the 
dispersed terrorist cells collaborate in a way that guides them toward common 
methodological principles.  These commonalities become evident in case studies of past 
terrorist attack operations, case studies from which both the terrorists themselves and 
antiterrorist officials draw lessons.  Numerous authors present case studies and analyses 
of transnational terrorist methodologies.  One striking theme that emerges is that 
terrorists use tactics that have been attempted or proven effective in the past.5  This 
tendency for terrorists to follow tactical precedents might offer authorities a weakness 
they can exploit through focused intelligence collection and analysis, most often derived 
from human sources. 
                                                 
4 For examples, see Philip B. Heymann, Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning without War 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2003); Brian Michael Jenkins, Countering al Qaeda: An 
Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions for Strategy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002); Paul K. 
Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence & Influence in Counterterrorism: A Component in the War 
on al Qaeda (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2002); Defeating the 
Jihadists: A Blueprint for Action, Century Foundation Task Force, Richard A. Clarke, chairman (New 
York, NY: The Century Foundation Press, 2004); Stephen Sloan, Beating International Terrorism: An 
Action Strategy for Preemption and Punishment, revised edition (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 
2002); Paul Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, paperback edition (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2003). 
5 Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam (New York, NY: I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 
2004), p. 236; Bruce Schneier, Beyond Fear: Thinking Sensibly About Security in an Uncertain World 
(New York, NY: Copernicus Books, 2003), p. 236; Pillar, “Fighting International Terrorism,” p. 19. 
3 
D. HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS 
One theme permeates the literature on intelligence: more (or better) human 
intelligence (HUMINT) is required to fight terrorism effectively.  This appears to be the 
consensus, from the 9/11 Commission to op ed pieces.6  American reliance on technical 
intelligence collection platforms (like signals or imagery intelligence) left the intelligence 
community ill-informed on the growing threat and attack plans by al-Qa’eda.  One 
common thread attributes part of the 9/11 “intelligence failure” to an inability to analyze 
raw information and develop a predictive outlook on al-Qa’eda’s impending operations.  
Sundri Khalsa asserts that collection was not a factor in the failure, though the 
intelligence community and its stakeholders historically tend to react to such failures with 
a misplaced emphasis on collection; rather, she characterizes the 9/11 debacle as an 
analytical failure.7  Thomas Dowling and Paul Pillar suggest analysts failed to interpret 
the available information accurately.8   
Colleen McCue, like Khalsa, recognizes the tendency to fix intelligence problems 
by focusing on information collection and sharing, but stresses the need to bolster 
analytical capabilities.9 Often, there is too much information for human beings to 
analyze, which Jonathan White argues contributed to the 9/11 failure.10  McCue and 
                                                 
6 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, authorized Edition [paperback] (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 
[2004]), pp. 415; Ralph Peters, “The Case for Human Intelligence,” Armed Forces Journal (July 2005): 24-
26; Mark V. Kauppi, “Counterterrorism Analysis 101,” Defense Intelligence Journal, vol. 11, no. 1 (Winter 
2002): 43; Robert L. Hubbard, “Another Response to Terrorism: Reconstituting Intelligence Analysis for 
21st Century Requirements,” Defense Intelligence Journal, vol. 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 71. 
7Captain Sundri K. Khalsa, USAF, “Terrorism Forecasting: A Web-Based Methodology,” Occasional 
Paper Number Eleven (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Joint Military 
Intelligence College, November 2004), pp. 1-2, 21. While this author’s own experience as a collector 
exemplifies Khalsa’s perspective regarding the post-incident emphasis on collection, others point to 
different reactions within the Intelligence Community. Michael Handel illustrates reactions within the 
analytical community that do not necessarily call for more information. Rather, the analysts focus on 
methodological reforms (to overcome biases); organizational reforms (to improve objectivity or reduce 
negative political influences), or “precautionary measures” (whereby the analysts hedge their bets and offer 
“worst case” analysis. (See Michael I. Handel, “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise,” in 
Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, eds. Richard K. Betts and 
Thomas G. Mahnken [Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003], pp. 19-22.) 
8 Thomas Dowling, “Failures of Imagination: Thoughts on the 9/11 Commission Report,” Defense 
Intelligence Journal, vol. 13, no. 1 & 2 (2005): 13-15; Pillar, “Fighting International Terrorism,” p. 20. 
9 Colleen McCue, “Data Mining and Predictive Analytics: Battlespace Awareness for the War on 
Terrorism,” Defense Intelligence Journal, vol. 13, nos. 1 & 2 (2005): 47. 
10 Jonathan R. White, Defending the Homeland: Domestic Intelligence, Law Enforcement and Security 
(Canada: Wadsworth/Thomson, 2004), pp. 23-25. 
4 
Khalsa advocate using automated analytical tools to handle the massive quantities of 
data, since they can process the information more effectively, efficiently and objectively 
than human analysts alone.11  Nevertheless, the human analyst must interpret the results 
that the automated system generates, in order to ascribe meaning to them in the proper 
context. 
Analysts face the daunting task of characterizing the terrorist threat and predicting 
future terrorist operations, and they must remain cognizant of common mental biases that 
may mislead them.  One recent school of thought suggests the Islamist threat has 
devolved into a loose, global network that is overwhelmingly decentralized. Scholars and 
analysts must take special care to avoid some pitfalls such a view may present.  Notably, 
general characterizations of the global network can oversimplify it, painting it as 
completely decentralized and virtually leaderless.  Such generalizations ignore the 
heterogeneous nature of the global apparatus and overlook elements of the network where 
hierarchical structure and centralization persist.  Furthermore, the appeal of network 
concepts may induce planners to adopt decentralized, network-centric approaches to 
fighting terrorism at the expense of proven, centralized operations. 
A general examination of human intelligence and attendant analysis thereof 
provides a promising context for intelligence in law enforcement antiterrorism efforts, 
since the bulk of law enforcement intelligence is derived from human sources of 
information (the occasional wiretap notwithstanding).  
E. LAW ENFORCEMENT ANTITERRORISM METHODS AND 
MEASURES 
Properly collected and analyzed terrorist threat intelligence enables authorities to 
develop sound, focused security countermeasures.  This thesis describes and evaluates 
intelligence techniques that domestic law enforcement officials can apply against Islamist 
transnational threats.  These methods have primarily been extrapolated from U.S. 
Intelligence Community methods in overseas operations.  Techniques must be tailored to 
the legal, political and social constraints of the domestic environment, and the capacities 
of the U.S. law enforcement community.  Certain established practices, such as 
employing informants, straddle both intelligence and law enforcement and yield methods 
                                                 
11 McCue, pp. 55-56, 58; Khalsa, pp. 3-4, 21. 
5 
that can be suited to antiterrorism.  This thesis extrapolates from various terrorist case 
studies, to include those cases where such intelligence-based antiterrorist or 
counterterrorist methodologies have been used.  The case studies include the attacks on 
the American embassies in Africa; the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen; the 9/11 
attacks; and numerous attacks post-9/11, such as the Madrid and London rail bombings, 
and smaller incidents of pre-operational target assessment that were interdicted by police 
before an attack could materialize.  Some offer insight into a very narrow portion of the 
terrorist methodology spectrum, such as a specific means of acquiring funds or elements 
of pre-attack reconnaissance operations.  Nonetheless, a broad range of narrow case 
studies reveals certain operational and tactical patterns.  Analyses of Al-Qa’eda and 
Islamist documents supplement the case studies, offering further insight into terrorist 
tactics and methods, while also placing them into a strategic and ideological context.  
F. THESIS SYNOPSIS 
Six chapters compose the thesis, which concentrates on the threat posed by 
transnational Islamist terrorism as influenced by al-Qa’eda’s Salafist global jihad.  The 
work begins with a presumption that the reader has a basic grasp of Islam and radical 
Islamic, transnational terrorism.  Following this Introduction, Chapter II discusses the 
grand strategy of the global jihad, as well as the operational methods jihadi terrorists 
employ to facilitate their attacks.  Since law enforcement intelligence primarily comes 
from human informants, and because human intelligence is uniquely suited to targeting 
terrorist operations, law enforcement antiterrorism intelligence best blends traditional 
police assets with intelligence community techniques.  Thus, Chapter III considers how 
law enforcement officials can apply human intelligence collection strategies against 
transnational Islamic terrorism, with a consideration of the distinct functional roles 
officers must fulfill.  Once intelligence has been collected in the field, the authorities 
must analyze it.  Analysis, under-appreciated and neglected in both the law enforcement 
and intelligence communities, receives special attention in Chapter IV, since it represents 
the bedrock of good operational planning and sound security countermeasure 
development.  The thesis concludes in Chapter V by examining risk assessment and 
security planning principles, and proposes a multi-layered evaluation methodology.  The 
appendices provide more detailed information and practical examples of such concepts as 
6 
al-Qa’eda intelligence collection requirements, source recruitment strategies, or use of 
Chapter Five’s proposed risk assessment methodology. 
G. A NOTE ON SPELLING, RENDITION OF FOREIGN TERMS, AND 
DATE CONVENTIONS 
Numerous foreign terms and names, principally in Arabic, appear in this work. 
Most terms are italicized, except for those that have become common in English usage, 
such as Islam, imam, mosque, jihad and jihadi.  They have been adopted wholesale into 
the English vernacular, and are therefore treated essentially as borrowed words.  Other 
terms of foreign derivation that have been Anglicized, such as the various “-isms” 
(Salafism, Islamism, or jihadism) are no longer purely foreign, and thus are treated as 
English words without italicization. 
The thesis uses a consistent romanized spelling convention throughout the text.  
However, terms and names that appear in quotes or citations retain their original spelling.  
Thus, al-Qa’eda may be spelled as “Al Qaeda” or “al-Qaida.”  Similarly, the name 
Muhammad may appear as Mohamed or another variant. The same holds true for date 
conventions.  This thesis uses the European day-month-year standard (e.g., 11 September 
2001), but dates that appear in quotations or the titles of cited works remain in their 
original form.  For example, the American date convention is retained when it is part of 
the title of a cited work such as, “Statement of Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Advisor to 
the President of the RAND Corporation[,] Before the Senate Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats[,] November 15, 2001.” 
The term “9/11” is employed as a generally accepted shorthand for 11 September 
2001 within the specific context of the terrorist attacks.  Thus, references to “post-9/11” 
policies and the “pre-9/11” era provide a less cumbersome means to delineate periods of 




II.  ISLAMIST TERRORIST METHODOLOGY 
The current global jihad departs from the brands of terrorism the world saw 
during the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s by virtue of its apparent worldwide nature and 
penchant for mass casualties.  The wide incidence of Islamist terrorism arguably does not 
represent a monolithic, centrally controlled campaign.  Nevertheless, the phenomenon 
bears certain identifiable hallmarks, particularly in methodology.  These methodological 
threads, woven together, create a recognizable jihadi signature.  Law enforcement and 
intelligence officials must study this methodological signature to guide their antiterrorism 
and counterterrorism planning.12 
Al-Qa’eda, as the self-proclaimed vanguard of the jihad, would like to exert as 
much influence as it can on global operations.13  Its degree of control varies across its 
constituency, but Islamist terrorists throughout the jihad have coalesced around some 
common operating principles which al-Qa’eda promulgated.  Even as techniques evolve, 
the players share their discoveries and participate in a form of group learning.  The 
methodologies that emerge represent the very threats law enforcement and intelligence 
officials endeavor to protect against. 
Those who claim leadership of the global jihad, such as ideologues and strategists 
associated with al-Qa’eda, provide both strategic and tactical guidance for the movement.  
Tactics normally derive from strategic objectives and pronouncements, but al-Qa’eda 
recognizes that the various affiliates or “franchise” groups that join the global jihad bring 
their own parochial goals with them.  Al-Qa’eda’s leaders have crafted a strategic outlook 
                                                 
12 Antiterrorism refers to defensive actions taken to protect against an attack, such target hardening. 
Counterterrorism consists of “offensive measures taken to interdict or respond to a terrorist act,” like 
arrests of terrorist cells, or post-incident investigations. (See Joseph Autera, “Before It Makes the 
Headlines: Effective Threat Detection Strategies and Tactics,” Journal of Counterterrorism and Homeland 
Security Studies (Fall 2003): 36.). 
13 Al-Qa’eda has accepted a diminished degree of direct control over many facets of the global jihad, 
“but there is also evidence of a structure that survives.” Al-Qa’eda will not accept a complete devolution 
into a “leaderless resistance” movement, which “would reduce al Qaeda [sic] to mere exhortation.” (Brian 
Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves [Santa Monica, 
CA: RAND, 2006], p. 34.) 
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that acknowledges these local agendas and gives the groups latitude to pursue them, but 
also strives to capitalize on their local efforts in support of its broader, global aims.14 
A.  STRATEGY AND VISION 
Al-Qa’eda’s overarching strategy incorporates both religious and political 
platforms.  A fundamentalist Islamist organization normally would not distinguish 
between the two, as Islam is arguably a complete way of life that guides faith and 
government in tandem.  Osama bin Laden is a shrewd politician, however, and 
undoubtedly recognizes that his constituency does not necessarily subscribe to the full 
salafi agenda.  His public pronouncements, though peppered with religious rhetoric, 
levied political demands: an end to the American troop presence in Saudi Arabia, a 
reversal of U.S. support for Israel and the “apostate” Arab regimes, and a U.S. 
disengagement from Iraqi affairs.15  Bin Laden’s political objectives resonate with many 
in the Muslim world, though his religious agenda may hold less attraction.16  Few would 
embrace a complete submission to an ultra-conservative, Taliban-style Caliphate. 
1.  The Strategic Plan 
Politics may frame the short-term agenda, but a religious vision underscores the 
grand strategy.  A seven-phase strategy for the global jihad publicly appeared in 2005.  
The work has been attributed to a high-ranking al-Qa’eda member, Muhammad Ibrahim 
                                                 
14 Center for International Issues Research, “Al-Qaida’s Global Strategy Part 4 of 5: Planning for the 
Future—Phases Four to Seven,” Global Issues Report (6 October 2006): 4 [electronic document]. 
15 Peter L. Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, First Touchstone 
Edition (New York, NY: Touchstone [Simon & Schuster, Inc.], 2002), pp. 226-227; Robert A. Pape, Dying 
to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (New York, NY: Random House, 2005), pp. 54-55. 
16 Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, lecture on Islamic fundamentalism at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Monterey, CA, 27 September 2006; LTC Michael F. Beech, U.S. Army, “Observing al Qaeda through the 
Lens of Complexity Theory: Recommendations for the National Strategy to Defeat Terrorism,” [U.S. Army 
War College Center for Strategic Leadership] Student Issue Paper, vol. 204-01 (July 2004): 12-14. Al-
Qa’eda propaganda strategy dictates that most proclamations “should include [al-Qa’eda’s] general goals 
which are acceptable to the people, [namely,] to get rid of the enemies of the Umma [i.e., America and the 
West] and their agents [i.e., the apostate regimes].” (Abu Bakr Naji, The Management of Savagery, 
translated by William McCants [{West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center} and {Cambridge, MA}: 
John M. Olin Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 May 2006], p. 47.) 
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Makkawi, known by his nom de guerre Makkawi as-Sayf al-Adel.17  The seven phases 
follow a two-decade timetable with key milestones:18 
• During Phase 1, “Awakening Phase,” from 2000 to 2003, al-Qa’eda 
initiated its war with the United States.  
• Al-Qa’eda is currently executing Phase 2, “Opening the Eyes Phase,” from 
2003 to 2006, where it hopes to establish an operating base in Iraq from 
which it intends to launch a wider campaign. 
• In Phase 3, “Rising and Standing Up Phase,” from 2007 to 2010, al-
Qa’eda will strike Israel in the hope the international community will 
recognize al-Qa’eda as the leader of the worldwide Muslim community, or 
umma. 
• Phase 4, “Rejuvenation Phase,” from 2010 to 2013, is marked by a 
campaign to replace apostate regimes with Islamic governments.  The war 
against the U.S. will intensify, with an emphasis on operations that will 
injure the American economy.  Such attacks include computer network 
attacks and assaults on the petroleum industry. 
• American hegemony and Israeli regional power will wane during Phase 5, 
“Announcing the Nation Phase,” between 2013 and 2016, while India and 
China become the new world powers.  The umma will announce the 
formation of the Caliphate (the “Islamic Nation”). 
• Phase 6, “Comprehensive Confrontation Phase,” beginning in 2016, 
represents the grand the Caliphate conquers the West. 
• Phase 7, “Final Victory Phase,” begins in 2020 and lasts a maximum of 
two years.  This phase marks the Caliphate’s consolidation of power and 
rule over the entire Islamic world. 
A similar work, written under the pseudonym Abu Bakr Naji, serves as a strategic 
manual for the global jihad.  Published as a volume rather than an Internet-based 
document, The Management of Savagery represents a more scholarly work for a more  
 
 
                                                 
17 Center for International Issues Research, “Al-Qaida’s Global Strategy Part 1 of 5: Antecedents and 
Evolution,” Global Issues Report (30 August 2006): 2 [electronic document]. His various aliases can be 
found at http://www.fbi.gov/wanted/terrorists/teraladel.htm (accessed 3 November 2006). 
18 The descriptions of the listed phases come from Center for International Issues Research, “Al-
Qaida’s Global Strategy Part 1 of 5,” citing the following Arabic language jihadi web sites: “Strategy of 
Al-Qaida [original title in Arabic],” Al-Ommh, http://www.alommh.net/estra.htm (accessed 29 December 
2005 and 5 January 2006); “Islamic Military Ideology [original title in Arabic],” Al-Ommh, 
http://www.alommh.net/forums/showthread.php?t=1629 (accessed 30 December 2005 and 5 January 2006); 
and “The Nation is Coming [original title in Arabic],” Al-Ommh, 
http://www.alommh.net/forums/showthread.php?t=1694 (accessed 30 December 2005 and 5 January 2006). 
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limited academic audience, replete with citations of other established Islamist 
ideologues.19  A careful reading of the work suggests Abu Bakr may be closely tied to al-
Qa’eda’s senior leaders.20 
The Management of Savagery places the global jihad into historical context, then 
plots a strategy for defeating the West (America and its allies) and the apostate regimes it 
props up in the Muslim world.  The work includes general instruction on organizational 
management and operational planning for terrorist cells.  Two principles permeate the 
strategy.  First, the vanguard of the global jihad should seek under-governed regions rife 
with chaos (“region[s] of savagery,” known in U.S. political vernacular as security 
vacuums), and move in to establish an Islamic order therein based on the sharia, similar 
to how the Taliban appropriated feudal Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal.21  This 
echoes strategic aims that al-Qa’eda promoted since its inception; currently, al-Qa’eda 
hopes to create an Islamist base or “emirate” in Iraq after forcing a U.S. withdrawal.22  
Second, Abu Bakr advocates a protracted conflict with America and the West.  The 
mujahedin should drain the enemy’s resources through military engagement with 
American forces (most notably in Iraq) and asymmetric attacks on U.S. economic targets 
in a campaign of “vexation and exhaustion.”23   
2.  Terrorist Warfare Evolving 
Economic warfare plays prominently in both Naji’s and al-Adel’s pieces, and 
petroleum resources figure prominently in their respective target lists.24  Naji’s prose 
hints at a shift in how the global jihad may employ terrorism, and a number of other 
                                                 
19 Center for International Issues Research, “Al-Qaida’s Global Strategy Part 5 of 5: Comparison of 
Al-Qaida’s Seven-Phase Strategy with ‘The Management of Savagery,’” Global Issues Report (30 August 
2006): 1-3 [electronic document]. 
20 Ibid., p. 1. 
21 Naji, p. 11. 
22 Combating Terrorism Center, Harmony and Disharmony: Exploiting al-Qa’ida’s Organizational 
Vulnerabilities (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 14 February 2006), p. 48. 
23 Naji., pp. 16-21. 
24 Center for International Issues Research, “Al-Qaida’s Global Strategy Part 5 of 5,” p. 5; Naji, pp. 
19-20, 21. Petroleum targeting is featured in other al-Qa’eda public discourse. In an al-Qa’eda videotape 
produced in September 2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri called for “strikes against [petroleum] infrastructure in 
the Persian Gulf region.” See Fred Burton, “Al Qaeda: Targeting Guidance and Timing,” Stratfor, 9 
December 2005, http://www.stratfor.com/products/premium/read_article.php?id=259453 (accessed 18 
February 2006). 
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Islamist pundits have embraced the new concept of “economic attacks.”25  Attacking 
targets (“particularly petrol” assets in the Middle East) to inflict economic damage will 
apply pressure to the United States, which in turn will squeeze its Arab allies for 
additional defensive measures.26  Naji’s treatise does include references to instilling fear 
in the enemy, but his discussion of economic attacks lacks any such allusion, suggesting 
al-Qa’eda may have added an element of axiological targeting27 (striking assets which an 
enemy values instead of targets whose destruction would simply induce terror or impair 
military capability) to its operational repertoire.  
Al-Adel’s endorsement of cyberattacks highlights another digression from 
traditional terrorism.  Al-Qa’eda hackers might disrupt an electronic commerce system or 
launch a denial of service attack, temporarily disabling part of a network, but such an 
attack would not constitute violence.  While consumers may fear a financial loss resulting 
from the network shutdown, they would not likely feel the same sense of terror inspired 
by a major bombing.28  Information system attacks would more closely resemble a form 
of harassment, certainly a valid component of asymmetric warfare,29 though not terrorism 
per se. This suggests al-Qa’eda embraces a more complex campaign strategy. 
3.  Information Operations 
Information operations and propaganda factor significantly in Al-Qa’eda’s global 
campaign plan.  Seized al-Qa’eda documents detail the organization’s structure, which 
includes a Informational Committee charged with propagating “al-Qa’eda’s vision of 
                                                 
25 Center for International Issues Research, “Postings Cite U.S. ‘Economic Weakness,’ Call for 
‘Economic Jihad,’” Global Issues Report (27 September 2006): 1-3 [electronic document]. 
26 Naji, p. 19. 
27 For a full discussion of axiological targeting, see Lt Col Peter W.W. Wijninga, Royal Netherlands 
Air Force, and Richard Szafranski, “Beyond Utility Targeting: Toward Axiological Air Operations,” 
Aerospace Power Journal (Winter 2000): 45-59. One should note that Naji feels stifling America’s access 
to petroleum has operational effects as well as economic ones, since a weakened economy has trouble 
sustaining a military campaign. It has the second effect of forcing The U.S. to divert resources to protect 
the economic assets, which reduces effective fielded troop strength and further drains the economy.  See 
Naji, pp. 21-22. 
28 Maura Conway, “Terrorism and IT: Cyberterrorism and Terrorist Organizations Online,” in 
Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Understanding the New Security Environment, eds. Russell D. Howard 
and Reid L. Sawyer (Guilford, CT: McGraw-Hill/Dushkin, 2004), pp. 273-275. 
29 Mao Tse-Tung, Mao Tse-Tung on Guerilla Warfare, translated and with an introduction by Samuel 
B. Griffith (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1961), p. 102. 
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jihad to all Muslims.”30  Naji assesses that many young mujahedin lack a firm grounding 
in the jihad’s religious and ideological principles, so the al-Qa’eda High Command—
composed of leaders who are “disciplined intellectually—must “communicate [al-
Qa’eda’s directions to these youth.”31  Al-Qa’eda must also disseminate its message 
beyond the ranks of the mujahedin and reach the general public.  Ideologue Mustafa 
Setmariam Nasar, alias ‘Umar ‘Abd al-Hakim, writing under the pen name Abu Mus’ab 
al-Suri, attributes the failures of  past jihads to an inability to rally the masses.  Imams 
(congregational clerics) need to play a role in firing up support in their congregations for 
the jihad, coupled with “aggressive media campaigns.”32 
A public media campaign figures prominently into the propaganda calculus.  Naji 
argues that when the “hostile media” cover terrorist operations with opprobrium, “there is 
no way to justify the operations save by issuing public statements.”33  Furthermore, the 
Western media bring news of successful terrorist operations into “every home of the 
unbelievers,” and thereby affect public opinion regarding Western activities in the Middle 
East.34  Lastly, non-traditional media, such as the Internet, have become a pivotal 
component in the jihadi propaganda machine.  The World Wide Web enables jihadi 
ideologues to reach a broad, global audience, particularly young Muslim adults who 
prefer the Internet as their primary news source over traditional print and broadcast 
media.35  Al-Qa’eda boasts a sophisticated, Internet-savvy media branch, the Global 
                                                 
30 Harmony Document AFGP-2002-000078, in Combating Terrorism Center, Harmony and 
Disharmony, p. 62. 
31 Naji, p. 59. 
32 Jarret M. Brachman and William F. McCants, Stealing Al-Qaida’s Playbook (West Point, NY: 
Combating Terrorism Center, February 2006), pp. 15, 17. (The specific quote comes from the report’s 
authors, not al-Suri. Also, the authors spell Nasar’s middle name “Setmarian,” but this appears to be a 
typographical error since multiple other sources spell it “Setmariam.”) 
33 Naji, p. 47. 
34 Naji, p. 92. 
35 Bruce Hoffman, “The Use of the Internet By [sic] Islamic Extremists,” CT-262-1: Testimony 
presented to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence on May 4, 2006 (Santa Monica ,CA: 
RAND, May 2006), p. 20, http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT262-1.pdf (accessed 12 
November 2006). 
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Islamic Media Front, which distributes jihadi multimedia productions to motivate and 
educate jihadis and sympathizers around the world.36  
Al-Qa’eda’s information dissemination apparatus does more than simply 
promulgate ideology and a broad vision.  It bridges the strategic and tactical levels of the 
campaign, for the dissemination system actually provides specific guidance, education 
and training to mujahedin in the field, arming them with the tools, tactics and techniques 
necessary to prosecute the jihad.  
B.  TOOLS, TACTICS AND TECHNIQUES 
Prior to 9/11 and the loss of its Afghan safe haven, al-Qa’eda promulgated 
operational skills and tradecraft through its training camps.  Al-Qa’eda codified much of 
this material in an internal text it published for its trainees and operatives, entitled 
Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants, and known simply in the West as the 
Al-Qa’eda Manual or the Terrorist Training Manual.37  The text covers, in detail, 
operational planning, intelligence collection, weapons construction and employment, 
logistics and security.  Al-Qa’eda employed a top-down teaching and learning approach 
until 2001.  Currently, with the al-Qa’eda core in hiding and geographically isolated from 
the minions in the field, learning in the global jihad has transitioned to a flatter form of 
information exchange using the Internet.  Al-Suri extols the Internet’s utility, for it can 
transform any Muslim household into a training camp, a recruiting center and a staging 
area for actual terrorist operations.38  Jihadi sites have proliferated, and peer-to-peer 
information sharing has become the norm.  Some higher-ranking experts and ideologues 
still promulgate top-down advice and direction, but they represent only one current of 
information flow among many. 
                                                 
36 Center for International Issues Research, “Al-Qaida’s Global Strategy Part 3 of 5: Phase 2 ‘Opening 
the Eyes’ Implementation,” Global Issues Report (6 October 2006): 3 [electronic document]. 
37 Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants [a.k.a. The al-Qa’eda Terrorist Training Manual or 
The Encyclopedia of Jihad], [attributed to Al-Qa’eda, ca. 1992 or 1993, translated by the Greater 
Manchester Constabulary, UK, ca. 2002]. 
38 Combating Terrorism Center, Harmony and Disharmony, p. 54. 
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The Internet has fostered a form of distance learning for terrorists in the global 
jihad.39  It enables geographically separated cells to communicate, exchange ideas and 
lessons learned, and share technical and tactical information in the furtherance of attack 
operations.  Al-Qa’eda’s Global Islamic Media Front even maintains an online training 
resource library.40  Web interaction is difficult for authorities to detect and intercept by 
virtue of its lack of physical movement and the Internet’s vast size.41  This relative 
security, coupled with its accessibility, makes the Internet an ideal medium for jihadi 
collaboration.   
1.  Innovators or Imitators? 
Shared learning and collaboration enable the global jihad because, 
methodologically, a terrorist will do tomorrow what worked for someone else yesterday.  
A cell will favor techniques similar to what other groups have employed, and will attack 
targets of the same type that other cells have successfully struck.  Brian Michael Jenkins 
of the RAND Corporation notes that “[t]errorists tend to be imitative.  One attack, when 
seen by terrorists as successful, inspires similar attacks.  We need only to look at airline 
hijackings and subway bombings.”42  The Algerian Armed Islamic Group bombed a Paris 
subway as early as 1995, and suicide bombers drafted a plan to attack the New York City 
subway two years later.43  The 11 March 2004 Madrid commuter train bombings were 
followed by the London suicide subway bombings on 7 July 2005.  Fourteen days later 





                                                 
39 Steve Coll and Susan B. Glasser, “e-QAEDA: From Afghanistan to the Internet—Terrorists Turn to 
the Web as Base of Operations,” The Washington Post (7 August 2005), 




42 Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation, p. 161. 
43 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Statement of Brian Michael Jenkins, Senior Advisor to the President of the 
RAND Corporation[,] Before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Emerging Threats[,] November 
15, 2001,” in Terrorism: Current and Long Term Threats, CT-187 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001). 
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subway again.  Not only did the second group hit the same target set as the first (subway 
trains and a double-decker bus), they also mimicked the attack method, using explosives 
hidden in knapsacks.44 
Terrorists borrow techniques from each other.  For all the talk of terrorists being 
creative and adaptable, most are relatively formulaic.  Behind every innovator, several 
imitators follow, and frequent imitation leads to proliferation.  Vehicle-borne improvised 
explosive devices (VBIEDs) represent the archetype of modern terrorist weapons 
delivery, from car bombs in Colombia, to truck bombs in Saudi Arabia, to boat bombs in 
Yemen, to hijacked, fuel-laden airliners in America.  Examples abound: the 1983 suicide 
truck bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon; Timothy McVeigh’s 1995 
truck bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City; the 1995 car bombing 
at the Office of the Program Manager-Saudi Arabian National Guard headquarters in 
Riyad in 1995; the 1996 truck bombing of the Khobar Towers U.S. Air Force dormitory 
in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia; the 1998 twin suicide car bombings of the American 
embassies in Africa; the suicide boat bombing in 2000 of the USS Cole in Yemen; and 
numerous car bombings in post-2003 Iraq.  VBIEDs are effective because they hold a lot 
of explosives and are mobile, enabling terrorists to assemble the explosive device at their 
leisure, far from the target,45 and then take it to the attack location when they are ready to 
strike. 
                                                 
44 Yael Shahar, “London Underground Partially Shut Down after Minor Explosions,” The Institute for 
Counter-Terrorism, 21 July 2005, http://www.ict.org.il/spotlight/det.cfm?id=1094 (accessed 5 November 
2006); Don Philpott, “The London Bombings: New Evidence Points to Al-Qaida and a New Terror 
Campaign,” Homeland Defense Journal Special Report, [2005], 
http://www.homelanddefensejournal.com/pdfs/LondonBombing_SpecialReport.pdf (accessed 5 November 
2006); Fred Burton, “The Psychological Battlefield,” Stratfor, 10 August 2005, 
http://www.stratfor.biz/Print.neo?storyId=253467 (accessed 18 February 2006). 
45 Al-Qa’eda apparently has a formula for the staging area as well.  The operatives in Tanzania and 
Yemen selected very similar houses to construct their explosive devices: “a single-family house with high 
walls, a gate, and a compound area in a neighborhoods where no one could see what was going on inside 
the house and yard.”  (Bergen, p. 115.)  A terrorist video of a VBIED assembly area in Chechnya depicts 
the same scene: The terrorists assembled the car bomb in a walled yard, attached to a house in a semi-rural 
neighborhood.  (Video available at 
http://www.ogrish.com/archives/footage_of_car_bomb_blowing_up_near_army_convoy_chechnya_2001_
Sep_12_2004.html [accessed 5 November 2006].) 
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Terrorists are persistent.  The old adage fits: “If at first you don’t succeed, try, try 
again.”46  Al-Qa’eda terrorists in Aden, Yemen, unsuccessfully tried to bomb the USS 
The Sullivans as it refueled in the harbor on 3 January 2000.  The attempt failed when the 
operatives overloaded the attack craft with explosives and sank it.47  The operatives 
regrouped and on 12 October attacked the USS Cole using a small, explosive-laden boat, 
killing seventeen U.S. Navy sailors.48 
The 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center most dramatically 
highlights the terrorists’ patience and persistence.  The 1993 bombing killed six and 
injured over a thousand people.49  It did not collapse the towers, however, a point FBI 
Special Agent Chuck Stern made clear to Ramzi Yousef, the operation’s chief planner, 
following his 1995 capture and extradition from Pakistan.50  Unfortunately, al-Qa’eda 
rejoined with the most audacious terrorist atrocity in history—more than eight years after 
the first attempt—and destroyed both towers, killing thousands of people.   
The 11 September attack clearly demonstrates the terrorists’ patience, persistence 
and imitative nature.  The fact Islamist terrorists re-engaged the World Trade Center was 
not a major surprise, in retrospect, since they had demonstrated their desire to strike it in 
1993.  Many people expressed shock, however, that the terrorists had used airliners as 
guided missiles, though the method actually had precedent.  The Japanese pilots 
introduced the kamikaze technique during World War II to great effect.  Terrorists have 
since dabbled with the concept over the years, though not with much success.  A defector 
debriefing disclosed North Korea and Iran developed a kamikaze pilot training program 
in 1989.51  They plotted to have a pilot fly an aircraft, loaded with explosives, into the 
White House.  Authorities stifled a similar plot in Nepal, in which terrorists were 
                                                 
46 Antiterrorism planners should not relax simply because a terrorist attempt on a given target, or 
target type, fails.  The terrorists—or another sympathetic cell—may try to strike the target again, perhaps 
out of stubborn pride, or an effort to blunt U.S. arrogance in face of the initial jihadi failure.   
47 Bergen., p. 189. 
48 Ibid., pp. 171-172. 
49 Gerald Posner, Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11 (New York, NY: Random House, 
2003), pp. 62-63. 
50 Ibid., p. 90. 
51 Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., Terrorism: the North Korean Connection (New York, NY: Crane Russack 
[Taylor & Francis New York, Inc.], 1990), p. 83. 
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allegedly planning fly a hijacked airliner into a target, possibly in India.52  In 1994, 
Armed Islamic Group terrorists took over an Air France passenger plane in Algeria with 
plans to explode it over Paris or crash it into the Eiffel Tower—until French commandos 
stormed the plane during a refueling stop in Marseilles.53 
After 9/11, terrorists are unlikely to hijack a plane successfully and use it as a 
guided missile.  The increased security measures, combined with a new passenger 
attitude, will stymie almost any hijacking attempt.  In the event terrorists get aboard an 
airliner with weapons, the passengers will likely turn on the hijackers, as the passengers 
did on United Airlines Flight 93.  Today, the latest scheme simply involves blowing up 
an airplane in mid-air.  Richard Reid, a.k.a. Abd al-Jabbar, tried to do so with explosives 
smuggled in his shoes aboard a December 2001 flight from England to the U.S.54  British 
authorities arrested a group of Islamic terrorists in August 2006 planning to board ten 
U.S-bound passenger planes with liquid explosives and blow the planes up during 
flight.55  Do these examples represent terrorist innovation?   
These operations hardly smack of originality.  They have precedent, even before 
9/11.  Sikh terrorists secreted explosive devices onto two airliners on 23 June 1985; both 
devices exploded, one in mid-flight.56  In a notorious example from 1988, Libyan agents 
placed an explosive device aboard Pan American Flight 103; the explosion destroyed the 
airborne plane near Lockerbie, Scotland.57  Suspected Chechen “Black Widow” suicide 
                                                 
52 Brian Michael Jenkins, “Statement of Brian Michael Jenkins...” 
53 Paul R. Pillar, “Fighting International Terrorism: Beyond September 11th,” Defense Intelligence 
Journal, vol. 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 19; Gus Martin, Understanding Terrorism: Challenges, Perspectives, 
and Issues (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, Inc., 2003), p. 236. 
54 Constable Steve Rocke, Peel Regional Police (Ontario, Canada), “Issues in Transportation Related 
[sic] Terrorism,” International Counter-Terrorism Officers [sic] Association 3rd Annual Conference, 
Orlando, FL, lecture, 20 October 2005. 
55 John Ward Anderson and Karen DeYoung, “Plot to Bomb U.S.-Bound Jets Is Foiled: Britain 
Arrests 24 Suspected Conspirators,” Washington Post Foreign Service (11 August 2006), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/10/AR2006081000152.html?referrer=email (accessed 3 October 2006). 
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bombers took down two Russian passenger planes on the same day in 2004.58  The 2006 
London trans-Atlantic plot not only followed precedent, but seems to have ridden on a 
recycled plan: Ramzi Yousef devised a scheme to blow up eleven airlines simultaneously 
over the Pacific in 1995.59  Code-named “Operation Bojinka,” al-Qa’eda shelved the 
plan, possibly because it was compromised when Yousef botched a separate operation in 
Manila, the Philippines.  When he fled, he left behind a laptop computer that contained 
details on “Bojinka.”60  Still, despite the fact that counterterrorism officials around the 
world soon learned about this audacious plan, a new cell tried to bring it to fruition 
eleven years later.  They were stopped, but if history is any guide, another cell will 
attempt a similar operation in the future.  Terrorists are passionate recyclers. 
2.  Intelligence 
Every operation, whether recycled or original, must be tailored to the unique 
circumstances presented by time and location.  Al-Qa’eda stresses the role of intelligence 
in pre-operational planning.  The Al-Qa’eda Manual has two chapters on espionage and 
intelligence gathering in which it outlines detailed collection requirements61 (see 
Appendix A), advice for blending into a target society (along with religious justification 
for looking like an infidel while undercover),62 and means by which to gather 
information.  Methods include using open sources and the media,63 recruiting 
informants,64 interrogating abductees and hostages,65 and physical reconnaissance and 
surveillance.66 
Terrorists rely heavily on pre-operational surveillance to learn about their 
potential targets.  The Al-Qa’eda Manual instructs operatives to sketch area maps of the 
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target’s vicinity, and to photograph the target and its environs.67  Prior to the 1998 attacks 
on the American embassies in Africa, “a local citizen reported seeing a 
man…videotaping the main gate of the Embassy compound” in Nairobi, Kenya.68  
Videotaping allows the surveillants to capture lots of imagery while recording vocal 
orientation on the audio, which proves especially useful if separate teams perform the 
surveillance versus the actual attack.69  A photographic or video record familiarizes the 
attack team with the target and helps them identify it when they arrive in the area to do a 
final pre-attack assessment, operational rehearsal or the actual strike.  Target 
recognizability—the ability to distinguish the correct target from other nearby facilities—
is a critical factor in target assessment.70  If authorities seize and review a videotape that 
focuses on distinctive markings, placards or signs on a facility in a way that appears to 
guide someone to that resource, the tape may represent a pre-operational surveillance 
record. 
Surveillance on a static facility discloses its physical characteristics like the layout 
and construction.  Terrorist planners normally require additional information about the 
activities at the facility, such as security protocols, traffic patterns or routine schedules.  
They may observe entry and exit procedures, shift changes at guard posts, or normal daily 
activity.  They may also probe the facility by attempting to gain entry, or by phoning in a 
bomb threat and watching the response and evacuation procedures.  The American 
Embassy in Nairobi received a number of bomb threats before the actual attack.71 
Long-term surveillance necessitates prolonged and continuous visibility of the 
target.  Al-Qa’eda operatives sometimes rent apartments overlooking the attack site.  
Ramzi Yousef  and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, future mastermind of the 9/11 attacks, 
plotted to assassinate Pope John Paul II during his January 1995 visit to the Philippines.                                                   
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Roughly a month before the visit, they and four other men took an extended rental in a 
hotel overlooking part of the Pope’s motorcade route through Manila.  (A fire in their 
room brought authorities to the scene and the perpetrators fled; the plot was thwarted by 
happenstance.)72  Similarly, the team that plotted the 2000 operations against the USS 
The Sullivans and the USS Cole rented a house on a hilltop that gave them a clear view 
of ships refueling in the harbor of Aden, Yemen.73   
3.  Mass Casualty Attacks 
Intelligence collection and detailed planning ultimately serve one objective: a 
lethal strike on the target.  Mass casualty attacks are al-Qa’eda’s hallmark, and the latest 
generation of terrorists are upping the ante.74  RAND’s Jenkins observes, “Body count 
appears to be the paramount criterion, outweighing any iconic value of a particular 
target—just about any crowded venue will do.”75  Naji argues sensational, high-casualty 
bombings draw media attention and amplify the enemy’s sense of fear,76 something Abu 
Musab al-Zarqawi and his ilk in Iraq have leveraged on the world media stage.77  Al-
Qa’eda encourages semi-autonomous affiliates to maximize the carnage—to a point.  The 
younger generation’s thirst for increasing bloodshed can have adverse political 
consequences down the road, upsetting al-Qa’eda’s old guard.78  Naji cautions newly 
emerging cells against pursuing an attack on the scale of 9/11, since an operation of that 
scope entails a degree of sophistication many smaller groups lack.  Extremely large and 
ambitious attacks normally need the type of support only the al-Qa’eda core can provide, 
so such operations should first be vetted through the “High Command.”  He adds that 
planning a very large-scale attack risks diverting a cell’s attention and resources from the 
numerous, smaller operations they could otherwise conduct to great effect.  Younger, 
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“nascent groups” should begin with more modest operations and solidify their 
proficiency before moving up to medium and large attacks.79  
Multiple, smaller attacks have the benefit of draining the opponent’s defensive 
resources.  Repeated attacks on a particular target type, such as oil refineries or pipelines, 
highlight a continuing vulnerability in that sector.  Likewise, if terrorists attack two 
targets of the same type “in a simultaneous operation in two different countries,” then 
governments across the globe will feel compelled to protect all such targets in their 
respective countries.  The “diversification and widening of the circle of targets…by 
small, separate groups” further bleeds the opponents in an ongoing “vexation” 
campaign.80 
Al-Qa’eda introduced simultaneous attacks against geographically separated 
targets in 1998, with the attacks on the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar-
es-Salaam, Tanzania.  One version of the al-Qa’eda operations manual recommends 
striking four targets simultaneously (as on 9/11) in order to maximize the impact on the 
Western opponent,81  which suggest al-Qa’eda grasps Westerners’ concept of time.  
Punctuality and synchronization have a sharp impact on the Western psyche, for they 
imply the adversary (al-Qa’eda) has tremendous efficacy in planning and coordinating 
actions, without geographic limitations.  Traditional Middle Eastern concepts of time and 
punctuality do not conform to Western cultural norms.  An appointment for “the evening” 
is often sufficient in the Middle East; a precise meeting time of five o’clock may be 
unnecessary.82  Al-Qa’eda has shown it is unrestrained by its own cultural paradigms, 
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and can employ Western concepts against its opponents to achieve a psychological 
advantage—almost a form of psychological jujitsu. 
Suicide attacks add another dimension to the mind game.  Suicide terrorism 
exacts a high cost on the perpetrator, a fact that illustrates the terrorists’ resolve to the 
opponent.  Staged against a backdrop of religious devotion, suicide attacks can signal the 
terrorists’ affiliation with a larger, presumably sympathetic, religious constituency.  From 
this constituency the target (the West) will see a pool of additional potential recruits, 
which induces the target to anticipate additional future attacks.83  Al-Qa’eda undoubtedly 
hoped to capitalize on this psychological effect in its suicide attacks of 1998 (U.S. 
embassies in Africa), 2000 (USS Cole) and 2001 (9/11).  The withdrawal of al-Qa’eda’s 
central core into hiding post-9/11, however, has foisted “operational planning [onto] the 
operatives themselves...[who] are willing to sacrifice their lives, but not to waste their 
sacrifice.  That pushes planners toward safe bets—easy targets,” using less sophisticated 
operations.84   
Perhaps the most frightening attack would be one involving weapons of mass 
destruction, or WMD.  Analysts and politicians have expressed great concern about al-
Qa’eda or its affiliates employing radiological bombs (“dirty bombs”), chemical agents or 
biological weapons.  Coalition forces in Afghanistan discovered traces of chemical and 
biological agents at captured al-Qa’eda compounds; additional evidence obtained by 
military forces and journalists includes training materials and videotapes of gas testing on 
dogs.85  Ironically, al-Qa’eda’s efforts to develop an unconventional weapons capability 
appear to have been in response to America’s fears about possible terrorist WMD use.  
Bin Laden’s deputy, Ayman al-Zawahiri, sent an e-mail to Muhammad Atef in April 
1999, in which he stated, “Despite their extreme danger, we only became aware of 
[WMD] when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns 
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that they can be produced simply with easily available materials…”86  A number of 
known or suspected al-Qa’eda proxies have attempted to conduct WMD attacks after 
2001, but have been thwarted by authorities.  In June 2002, authorities arrested Jose 
Padilla, who was suspected of building a radiological bomb for an attack in the U.S.  
Authorities in Thailand foiled a suspected cesium-137 radiological bomb plot in June 
2003.  An alleged chemical bomb attack against the Jordanian General Intelligence 
Department headquarters in Amman was also stymied in April 2004.  Finally, police in 
August 2004 apprehended members of a cell in London with technical information on 
chemical weapons and pre-operational planning data on potential targets.87   
The number of attempted WMD uses is low when compared to conventional 
explosive attacks.  Al-Qa’eda’s use of WMD, for the most part, seems to be restrained by 
a political calculus.  The central organization “employs violence for clear political 
aims”88 as outlined in its grand strategy, and it endeavors to corral the outlying affiliates 
within approved parameters as much as possible.  Just as al-Zarqawi’s ruthless 
beheadings in Iraq drew censure from the general Muslim public,89 indiscriminate WMD 
attacks could damage al-Qa’eda’s (and the overall global jihad’s) political capital.  This 
may be why Al-Qa’eda refuted allegations that the 2004 plot in Amman involved 
chemical agents.90  Ramzi bin al-Shibh, one of the architects of the 9/11 operation, gave a 
secret interview to Arabic media outlet al-Jazeera, during which he noted al-Qa’eda had 
aborted a strike on a nuclear power plant because the planners could not gauge the 
ultimate outcome—an outcome with potentially disastrous consequences.91  Similarly, 
releasing a biological contagion could backfire and undermine support for the jihad.  
Given today’s global interconnectedness through international travel and trade, terrorists 
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can expect a disease to spread to many countries, including those with populations 
sympathetic to al-Qa’eda.  Jenkins asserts, “The crowded cities of Asia, the Middle East, 
and Africa, with their much weaker public health systems, are far more vulnerable to a 
pandemic than are American towns and cities….Contagious diseases…can only be 
initiated, not confined.”92  Al-Qa’eda, with its astute appreciation for propaganda and 
public relations, will most likely employ any weapons of mass destruction cautiously, 
ensuring their use furthers the long-term objectives of the global jihad.   
C.  LESSONS FOR ANTITERRORISM OFFICIALS 
What should law enforcement and intelligence officials take from this overview?  
They should recognize al-Qa’eda’s strategic roadmap for the global jihad, and how the 
jihad’s strategic apparatus translates to tactical terrorist operations.  Although al-Qa’eda’s 
High Command may have physically withdrawn into hiding, leaving much more of the 
burdens for planning and execution on local affiliate cells, the Internet allows al-Qa’eda 
to maintain a degree of contact with them and provide them ideological and operational 
guidance.  The Internet, by allowing far-flung cells to share ideological, operational and 
technical information, actually draws many of them into the parameters of a recognizable 
modus operandi (method of operation, or MO).  Disparate terrorist cells have routine 
access to al-Qa’eda strategic indoctrination materials, and their collaborative nature 
encourages them to use familiar tactics against like targets, thus shaping a general pattern 
that law enforcement and intelligence analysts can evaluate and exploit in crafting 
defensive measures. 
The web-based “electronic jihad” represents a powerful enabler for jihadi cells, 
but it also exposes them because of the web’s open nature.  Jihadis simply rely on the 
Internet’s size to hide anonymously amidst millions of licit users.  If antiterrorism 
officials partner with media and Internet watchdog groups, they can get leads on which 
sites the jihadis use.  An undercover informant who has already tapped into the electronic 
jihad can provide specific URLs (uniform resource locators) that are kept close-hold in 
jihadi circles.  Staying abreast of the web chatter, antiterrorism officials can monitor 
ideological threads, al-Qa’eda targeting directives, and tactical trends.  Law enforcement 
and intelligence officers can use the anonymity that the Internet provides to insert 
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themselves undercover into the “electronic jihad,” pretending to be sympathizers or up-
and-coming terrorists themselves.  From there, they can gather intelligence about specific 
plots, or develop sting operations. 
Antiterrorism officials ultimately must stay abreast of terrorist strategy, tradecraft 
and targeting.  As the terrorists attempt to guide each other in prosecuting the global 
jihad, they inadvertently share that guidance with the antiterrorism specialists.  This 
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III.  THE JOY OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE: ITS UNIQUE 
APPLICATION TO HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
ANTITERRORISM 
Law enforcement agencies routinely gather and evaluate information to 
investigate crime and accidents, monitor trends, and curb ongoing criminal activity.  
Some information rightly constitutes intelligence, since police collect it and assess it 
using a systematic process in order to derive conclusions about a particular subject of 
inquiry.  The law enforcement community traditionally associated intelligence with 
narcotics or gang enforcement operations, but today’s growing terrorist threat places an 
even heavier demand on police intelligence.  Methodologically, the police can fulfill that 
demand using the same tools they apply to other criminal intelligence operations.  Police 
derive much of their intelligence from people—human sources of information.  
A. EMERGING ROLES IN PREVENTIVE POLICING THROUGH 
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND EXPLOITATION 
The American public has always relied on police at all levels to curb criminal 
activity and preserve a safe environment.  Naturally, the success of police efforts varies 
over time and location.  Only recently, however, has the criminal opponent posed such a 
formidable threat to the very security of our nation.  For our nation’s police, the 
coordinated transnational terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 represented a change in 
criminal targeting; they were more akin to a military act of war, aimed at hobbling a 
nation, than a violent act perpetrated to further a criminal pursuit of profit.  True, the 
United States has had few mass casualty terrorist events on American soil—Oklahoma 
City and the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993; but the scale of the attacks, 
coupled with their narrow scope, made them tragic anomalies in our relatively secure 
history.  The scope of the al-Qa’eda attacks, however, has revealed them to be part of a 
broader campaign than any America has encountered at home before.  The planning and 
targeting continue, and the public—the constituents of our law enforcement agencies—
demand that the police rise to the challenge and mitigate the threat head-on.  Our public 
servants at all levels—local, county, state and federal—must adopt a common set of law 
enforcement roles aimed at gathering, analyzing and using intelligence to prevent the 
next terrorist event, rather than merely investigating the last attack. 
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When people talk about “roles” in the war on terrorism and homeland security, 
they most often mean agency or department functions.  The nation charges the Central 
Intelligence Agency and the other various intelligence organizations with identifying and 
locating terrorists abroad, and detecting their plans to attack American interests in 
advance.  The military is responsible for striking the enemy on his home turf and rooting 
out the threat far from our shores.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation works to uncover 
terrorists who have slipped past the first two groups and made it through the borders in 
the final stages of their targeting—or “home grown” terrorists of U.S. residency who 
already live in the country.  Unfortunately, the state, county and local police often find 
themselves left with incident response—when all others have failed to prevent an attack 
from happening, our police officers, EMTs and firefighters are left to clean up the mess.  
While these roles are valid, they cannot be the sole model by which we frame our 
homeland security posture.  It is more useful to examine functional roles, which are not 
restricted to specific agencies, as a mechanism to harness the country’s organic 
capabilities to fight terrorists on our home soil.  Those roles, properly integrated, can help 
law enforcement develop and use intelligence to secure America. 
Intelligence is the key to gaining ground against the terrorists.  The public isn’t so 
much interested in a post-incident investigation that fixes blame for terrorist activity to a 
given group.  While that is important from a justice—and perhaps a deterrence—
perspective, preventing terrorism in the first place is paramount.  Military planners and 
law enforcement officers alike understand the value of advance information when it 
comes to proactive operations.  Much like a raid on an enemy military compound, a 
police raid or proactive bust relies heavily on advance intelligence for success.  The 
intelligence may come from a variety of sources: area casing and reconnaissance, 
confidential informants, trash covers, mail covers, wiretaps or undercover officers.  The 
police use the same techniques as intelligence agents; they simply use them in a different 
environment, within different legal guidelines, and against different targets.  Those police 
agencies that excel in gathering and exploiting criminal intelligence can attribute their 
crime fighting success to the roles they employ in that endeavor.  Often one group of 
officers handles the informants, while others analyze the gathered intelligence, and still 
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others specialize in the actual operation.  In smaller departments, officers fill multiple 
roles, but the roles can nevertheless be viewed as distinct.  
The first is the role of the uniformed police officer, or for the sake of discussion, 
the patrolman.  This is the uniformed cop who walks a beat, rides a patrol, or mans a 
fixed post.  The patrolman is the visible authority figure in society.  Most often the patrol 
officer first receives reports of suspicious activity or an actual crime.  In addition to being 
the obvious “go-to” officer for the neighborhood citizens, the patrolman enjoys an 
intimate familiarity with his or her duty post.  The patrolman knows all the players, good 
and bad, and all the games on the beat.  If a new player slips into town, the patrolman 
should know it.  It’s the patrol officer who can best detect when something’s amiss.  The 
key to detecting pre-operational terrorist activity is to know the daily norm, and to notice 
when something arises that doesn’t belong. 
The next role is that of the agent.  Officers filling this role are the plain clothed 
police: the special agents, the investigators and the detectives.  Their job is to bridge the 
gap between the uniformed officers and intelligence analysts.  An agent typically 
conducts interviews, runs source and informant networks, and digs up bits of information 
that he can piece together to track down criminals and criminal activity.  In the context of 
this thesis, it means terrorists and their operations. 
The third role is that of the analyst, who is responsible for collating and analyzing 
raw data from the field.  The analyst is expected to draw predictive conclusions from the 
evaluated data.  In other words, the analyst helps law enforcement anticipate the enemy’s 
next move.  The analyst may reside at any level of law enforcement—federal, state, 
county or local.  Analysts at different levels have access to different raw data within their 
respective jurisdictions, but they must all share with each other, laterally and vertically, to 
make sure they and their officers on the street see how their respective agencies and 
jurisdictions fit into a larger picture or context—regionally, or in some cases, nationally 
or internationally. 
The three roles interact in a cycle (see Figure 1) wherein they gather and exploit 
intelligence.  The patrolman observes his environment and collects basic threat 
information.  The agent can also make passive observations, but focuses most of his 
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energy actively collecting information and applying low level analysis to it.  The analyst 
gathers together information reported from the patrolman and agent in the field and 
systematically analyzes it.  The analyst devises patterns and predictions of terrorist 
behavior, generating new information in the form of finished intelligence which can be 
sent out to the field to focus future observation and collection. 
 
Figure 1 Law Enforcement Intelligence Roles 
 
In each phase of the cycle, the various participants must assess the information 
they have gathered, developed or received—that is, determine its importance within the 
context of their respective roles and environments—and act appropriately based upon 
that assessment.  Such action can include sharing information with other participants, to 
investigating suspicious activities, to making an arrest or to instituting defensive 
antiterrorism countermeasures. 
B. HUMINT IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 
The art of intelligence and spycraft predates the first reconnaissance satellite by 
several thousand years.  Ancient intelligence derived from human sources.  Even today, 
different agencies and different disciplines, from police to intelligence agencies to 
journalists, still use this common source of information—namely, people—though they 
may call them by different names: “sources,” “informants,” “spies,” “agents,” or “assets.”  
It all constitutes human intelligence, or HUMINT.  
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HUMINT is uniquely suited to ground-level collection on terrorists.  HUMINT 
can “look where the most sophisticated imaging satellite cannot begin to see—inside the 
human soul.”93  A well-placed human source can provide insight into an adversary’s 
preconceptions, motivations, and intentions, engendering predictive intelligence. 
Technical collection platforms won’t forecast terrorist attacks.  Also, “[m]ost of the 
terrorist preparations that matter occur not in camps in the countryside of some place like 
Afghanistan, but in apartments in places like Beirut, Hamburg, New Jersey, or Florida.”94  
Imagery cannot zero in and identify terrorists in dense urban environments; furthermore, 
disposable cell phones, human couriers, coded talk and commercial encryption 
complicate technical collection on terrorist communications.95  An organizational insider, 
however, can provide detailed information on group membership, structure, location, 
capabilities, weaknesses and plans—the very things a terrorist organization labors to keep 
secret. 
Human intelligence (HUMINT) represents a staple of law enforcement 
intelligence collection, particularly in proactive operations.  Just as human informants 
play a key role in proactive narcotics operations, so, too do they in antiterrorism and 
counterterrorism efforts.  HUMINT is a critical component in a terrorism prevention 
program, for it uncovers indicators of a terrorist presence in a given jurisdiction, 
information about specific terrorist personnel in the area, and clues about local terrorist 
activity.  A multi-layered collection approach can offer authorities a variety of sources 
with complementary access to information and placement vis-à-vis terrorists and their 
support apparatus.  Many of these potential sources, it should be noted, hail from specific 
ethnic and religious communities, by virtue of the Islamist jihadi threat on which 
authorities focus their collection efforts.  The unique demographic dimension necessitates 
collectors to exercise a degree of cultural savvy in finding, recruiting and handling such  
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sources.  Careful, planned source handling will afford police unmatched access to 
information on terrorist activity and plans in their area, enabling them to unravel any 
plots and thwart a future attack. 
C.  LOOKING FOR CLUES—JUST WHAT ARE WE LOOKING FOR? 
Intelligence supporting antiterrorism programs has one primary purpose: 
preventing a terrorist attack.96  Intelligence information may also assist in post-incident 
investigation and prosecution, but today’s emphasis underscores prevention.  Even post-
incident information, while fulfilling evidentiary requirements for the prosecutorial case, 
should simultaneously feed analytical efforts to forestall the next attack. 
Field collectors perform a proactive threat detection function for the analysts, 
seeking information that points the analysts to future terrorist operations.  Terrorist cells, 
particularly those in targeted countries, are naturally secretive.  Terrorist operatives 
nevertheless emit certain clues to their presence and their activities will display a distinct, 
though perhaps subtle, signature.  These activities alert analysts to potential terrorist 
operations and are called indicators: both requisite and likely occurrences that one could 
observe as a terrorist “scenario unfolded.” 97   
Conversely, an indication is something that has already happened that fits into an 
indicator category.  In other words, an indication suggests the scenario has already 
manifested itself.98  Analysts use indicators to predict the likelihood a single act might 
occur, while they employ indications to develop patterns and trends concerning multiple 
events.  Proactive, preventive law enforcement and intelligence operations focus on 
indicators.  Authorities must seek and recognize indicators of a terrorist organization’s 
presence in their jurisdiction, for the terrorist network members themselves, and for their 
activities.  
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1.  Indicators of Terrorist Presence 
Authorities must first determine if terrorists themselves have appeared in their 
jurisdiction.  In the case of Islamist terrorists, how might one know if jihadis or al-Qa’eda 
affiliated cells are present in a given area?  Generally the first clue is “talk about town” 
concerning a particular Salafist group, often centered around key clerics or dynamic, 
vocal and charismatic informal leaders who openly espouse Salafist or jihadist beliefs.  
Vocal members of the community, preaching violent, anti-western rhetoric or espousing 
global jihad serve as a clear sign of a militant element in the community.  Another clue to 
Salafist influence would be if people in the community begin taking on traditional Salafi 
ways, such as traditional dress and grooming (beards),99 because Salfists are first and 
foremost Salafi.   
The best sources to identify a Salafist cell would be moderate, non-Salafist 
Muslims who consider this subset of their community an unwelcome addition.  Marc 
Sageman suggests finding sources in the fundamentalist Muslim community where 
Salafist sub-groups are likely to emerge.100  More moderate Muslims, to include clerics, 
may find this militant bent disruptive.  Salafists sometimes taut their religious superiority, 
lording it over the other “less devout” Muslims in the community; the Salafists may 
chastise them for their lack of devotion to the true path of Islam as Muhammad intended 
it to be.  (Not surprisingly, the Arab mujahedin in Afghanistan alienated themselves from 
many Afghans because they regularly derided the Afghans as impious Muslims.)101 
2.  Individual Terrorist Network Members  
Besides spotting Islamist or Salafist enclaves, one can further identify individual 
terrorist members by working the association chain.  It may be possible to find terrorists 
by identifying potential associates first and working toward the hardened operatives.  The 
associates are not necessarily members of the Islamist or Salafist clique themselves, or 
even witting supporters of the terrorist cell.  Some of them are friends; others are 
relatives; still others are people who live or work in close proximity to the operatives and 
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are in a position to observe them and pinpoint any behaviors or activities indicative of 
terrorist affiliation.  These might include landlords, delivery people, maintenance 
workers, neighbors, shopkeepers or fellow mosque congregants. 
Possible inroads to the association chain can also come from immigration 
screening whereby people with certain travel histories are flagged.  Immigration 
inspectors should scrutinize people entering the country who have logged travel to a 
number of “hot” nations where global Islamist terrorists have concentrated or been active, 
such as Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, North Africa, Egypt, the 
Arabian Peninsula, the Caucasus region, Pakistan, Iran, France, Spain, Germany, 
Canada102 or England.   
Immigrations intelligence analysts can take these flagged travelers and cross-
reference the information they provided on their immigration declaration forms with that 
of other flagged travelers. These forms should list their home addresses as well as their 
intended destination address in the United States.  Immigrations officials can question the 
travelers during secondary screening, while also gathering information from their 
passports, airline tickets and receipts, and other travel documentation.  Any personal 
references or business references the travelers offer during secondary screening also join 
the data pool.  The analysts can cross-reference all of the data, from addresses to travel 
histories to names, against the data from their traveling companions and against 
information in standing databases.  The analysts can perform link analysis to see if any 
common names, addresses, telephone numbers, or travel histories pop up as suspicious or 
unusual.  Do different flagged travelers list the same references or addresses?  Are any of 
their data elements linked with other noteworthy data in the databases?  Subsequently, 
anybody these flagged travelers contact in the U.S. should be considered “of interest” 
(not suspicious or guilty by association) and earmarked for closer observation or 




                                                 
102 Given the volume of cross-border traffic between the United States and Canada, flagging visitors 
merely on this travel criterion may prove unproductive. 
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Such link analysis can identify terrorists.  Heather MacDonald of the City Journal 
notes: 
Had a system been in place in 2001 for rapidly accessing commercial and 
government data, the FBI’s intelligence investigators could have located 
every single one of the 9/11 team once it learned in August 2001 that al-
Qaida operatives Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaq al-Hazmi, two of the 9/11 
suicide pilots, were in the country. By using…link analysis…investigators 
would have come up with the following picture: al-Midhar’s and al-
Hazmi’s San Diego addresses were listed in the phone book under their 
own names, and they had shared those addresses with Mohamed Atta and 
Marwan al-Shehi (who flew United 175 into the South Tower of the 
World Trade Center). A fifth hijacker, Majed Moqed, shared a frequent-
flier number with al-Midhar. Five other hijackers used the same phone 
number Atta had used to book his flight reservations to book theirs. The 
rest of the hijackers (who crashed in Pennsylvania) could have been 
tracked down from addresses and phones shared with hijacker Ahmed 
Alghamdi [who was in the U.S. on an expired visa].103 
Authorities can also identify individual terrorists by investigating suspected 
organizational activities.  Naturally, the people engaged in said activities will be 
associates or actual members of the network.  Like any narcotics operation, where the 
street dealers and mules have a lesser investment in the criminal organization than the 
kingpin drug lords, low-level terrorist operatives—those acquiring funds and materiel or 
providing logistical support—will have less knowledge of the overall terrorist 
organization and plans than the key leaders.  In fact, some peripheral supporters may not 
even recognize their link to a terrorist enterprise.  Nevertheless, these people are 
connected ultimately to the core, and investigators can work their way along those links, 
deeper into the terrorist organization. 
3.  Indicators of Terrorist Activity 
Terrorist activity displays several signatures, depending on the activity’s specific 
nature.  U.S. intelligence analysts interpolate indicators from field reports on such things 
as terrorist training, pre-operational surveillance of targets, tests of security at targeted 
facilities, terrorist travel patterns and travel data on specific individuals, and the 
movement of terrorist weapons and materiel.104  These activities reflect pre-operational 
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(pre-attack) preparations.  Discerning indicators from more strategic, long-term 
preparatory actions requires an eye for subtlety. 
Early stages of forming cells and support networks are less apparent than pre-
operational targeting and planning.  The formation of terrorist support networks and 
small cells tends to stay within the Muslim community, offering few indicators to the 
general public, while target assessment and later planning stages require the operatives to 
venture forth into the public at large, where their potential targets are.   
The early phases of group formation are the hardest to detect, but afford law 
enforcement officials more time to collect information on the groups as the threat of 
actual attack is not imminent.  As mentioned earlier, one indicator is the emergence of 
Salafist cliques within the Muslim community—young men who often isolate themselves 
from family, old friends or associates in favor of the new, religiously zealous clique.  
Groups of Salafists may reside together and share an apartment or house, focusing their 
lives on this new way of life emulating the salaf.  For many, this may be the extent of 
their activity, and they may never make contact with actual terrorist cells.  Some of these 
groups, however, may inquire into joining the jihad; they ask around the community 
looking to find someone with links to the global jihad network.  Such links may be found 
with outspoken individuals professing jihad or telling war stories from regional jihadi 
struggles in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Iraq or the Philippines.   
Ongoing terrorist cell activity includes fund-raising efforts.  Most often these 
occur below the radar, and only recently have law enforcement organizations started to 
scrutinize seemingly innocuous fund-raising and charitable activities for potential 
connections to terrorist organizations.  Press reports have highlighted the connections 
between a number of Muslim charities and Islamist terrorist organizations.  These so-
called charities serve as financial fronts to collect money from Muslims and funnel it to 
terrorist groups.  Some of the contributors remain unaware their donations are destined 
for terrorist operations; others are keenly aware of the scam and consciously support it, 
knowing full well where their funds are headed.105 
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Local collections at the mosque, much like Sunday service collection in church, 
are commonplace.  Where the money actually goes once collected, however, remains the 
chief cleric’s purview.  The mosque imam normally enjoys full discretion over the 
disbursement of the congregation’s contributions.  The community entrusts the imam to 
use the tithes (the zakat) to aid the poor, as this is a traditional responsibility levied upon 
Islamic clergy.  But, if the imam has ties to Islamist groups, he may send money to them, 
with little transparency to his congregants.106  The authorities must identify outspoken, 
radical imams who have suspected sympathies for terrorist organizations—or familial ties 
to known members of the organizations—and investigate their financial activities. 
Criminal enterprises that implicate Muslims or Middle Eastern immigrants107 
require closer inspection, with an eye toward where the profits ultimately go.  
Investigators have often considered such schemes nothing more than economic crimes of 
greed, without considering their potential role in a larger, organized terrorist fund-raising 
apparatus.  Seemingly petty operations may only bring in small sums within any one 
given jurisdiction.  Similar or identical schemes, however, may have been established in 
numerous areas around the country, all funneling their small profits to a central collection 
point.  A careful criminal intelligence assessment of these activities should identify any 
such connection. 
Intelligence specialists must perform link analysis between the criminal suspects 
across the country to uncover connections or commonalities between them and their 
activities.  Do they come from the same part of a given foreign country, or have they 
lived in the same U.S. city at some time in the past several years?  Do they have a 
common address in their residence history?  Do they use the same wireless phone 
company or Internet service?  Who owns each store or business that’s serving as the 
front? The stores may all title back to one owner or one family in another state.  The 
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businesses may bank with the same financial institution, or make financial contributions 
(think corporate tax deductions) to a common Islamic charity or scholarship fund.   
Routine criminal investigations may thus yield information relevant to 
antiterrorism operations and investigations.  Police additionally should expect to collect 
terrorism-specific information and generate leads outside of criminal inquiries, directly 
from managed human sources. 
D.  TYPES OF HUMINT AVAILABLE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT – THREE 
LAYERS 
Law enforcement officials cannot situate themselves everywhere to spot criminals 
and terrorists.  Human source networks provide the extended range authorities need to 
keep watch for terrorists and their activities.  Police use human informants as a staple law 
enforcement tool.  This familiar concept boasts deep roots in the profession, only a new 
target has emerged, requiring a slightly modified set of human sources.  (Appendix B 
provides examples of various human sourcing operations.)   
Citizens will have varying degrees of placement on the streets and in the 
community, and they will enjoy access to different types of information regarding 
terrorist operations.  A layered approach to developing source networks, or sourcing, can 
give authorities information from broad, general indicators of terrorist presence, all the 
way down to details regarding specific cells and operational activities.  The three layers 
consist of (1) a public awareness campaign soliciting the public at large to report 
suspicious activity; (2) open contacts networks, where police work openly with members 
of specific communities or organizations to facilitate a neighborhood watch; and (3) 
confidential informants who discretely provide police with detailed information on 
targeted terrorist groups and their support base. 
1.  Public Awareness Campaign 
Law enforcement officers often cannot observe terrorist indicators directly, while 
human source networks provide the necessary coverage.  An informed, alert community 
becomes a force multiplier for the police, with countless eyes and ears keeping a lookout.   
National Sheriff’s Association member Dean Keuter, Jr., founded the 
Neighborhood Watch program in 1972 with the goal of energizing citizens to spot and 
report criminal activity in their residential areas.  President Bush’s administration 
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established the USA Freedom Corps following 9/11 to curb terrorism in the United 
States, and one of the Corps’ subordinate organs, the Citizen Corps, subsumed the 
Neighborhood Watch program.  The government soon allocated funding to bolster and 
expand Neighborhood Watch, with a new aim to detect and report terrorist-related 
activity.108 
Public awareness (PA) campaigns provide authorities a potential network of eyes 
and ears that can detect indicators of terrorist presence and activity.  Such a program’s 
success hinges on active involvement on the part of the citizens and the police.  Merely 
advertising a hotline and encouraging the public to report “suspicious activity” will prove 
insufficient and potentially problematic.  The authorities must educate the public for the 
initiative to succeed; without proper training or education on what constitutes “suspicious 
activity,” the citizens may fall into the trap of reporting on what they perceive as 
suspicious people, often people who just happen to be different from them—usually 
ethnically different.  The result—heightened ethnic tensions in the community—can 
prove counterproductive, both by eliciting false positives and by alienating segments of 
the population.109 
Citizens can recognize uncharacteristic behavior and occurrences in their 
neighborhood, but sometimes terrorist indicators are subtle, and people don’t always see 
the connection between something odd and something potentially sinister.  The PA 
campaign must advise people what specific things should concern them, and what types 
of observations they should report.  The U.S. Air Force Eagle Eyes campaign represents a 
good benchmark.  The Air Force reached out to the communities near Air Force 
installations in an effort to build neighborhood observation networks outside the base 
perimeters.110  The campaign included radio, television and billboard advertisements; 
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pamphlets and briefings; as well as door-to-door appeals in the neighboring 
communities111 by base law enforcement officials. 
An active public awareness campaign sets the antiterrorism agenda in the 
community and invites people to take information to the police.  The next level removes 
the police from behind the hotline telephone and into the streets, putting them into close 
working contact with the community citizens. 
2.  Open Contacts 
Law enforcement agencies can maintain regular open contacts in the community.  
These people serve as regular sources of information, the nature of which exposes them 
to very little personal risk.  Thus, the police do not need to handle them as confidential 
informants or protect their identity.  Open contacts have access to information which 
police may find useful, but they are not levied to undertake operational activity, such as 
seek contact with terrorist suspects or actively pursue information directly from suspects.  
Their association with the authorities may be acknowledged, or at least not disavowed if 
kept somewhat quiet.   
An open contact normally maintains a position or location to see occasional 
terrorist activity indicators, or may be well placed to see them routinely.  Should the open 
contact find himself routinely reporting, where contact with suspect individuals appears 
likely, the handlers should consider converting the open contact into a confidential 
informant in the interest of source safety and operational security. 
3.  Confidential Informants 
Confidential informants potentially provide the most detailed and specific 
information police can hope to acquire about terrorist suspects.  Their proximity and 
access to potential terrorists and their associates gives them unique insight, but also 
places them at greater risk.  If the suspects discover an informant’s association with the 
authorities, both the collection operation and the informant become compromised.  The 
loss to the operation may be months or years of investigative effort.  The loss to the 
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informant may be even greater.  Therefore, a confidential informant’s identity, and his 
relationship with the police, must remain secret. 
E.  SOURCE ACCESS 
One may categorize the various human sources of information, be they 
neighborhood watchers, open contacts or recruited informants, by the type of access they 
have to terrorist-related information. 
1.  Unassociated Observers 
Those sources who have no expected contact or association with terrorists may 
still be in a position to observe emergent terrorist activity.  Such unassociated observers 
would include people who live or work in a location from which they may observe pre-
operational terrorist preparation, such as target surveillance or supply acquisition.  One 
will generally find these sources around potential terrorist targets, or places where 
terrorists might acquire operational materials.  A retired woman112 who lives across the 
street from a potential terrorist target may be in a position to see such surveillance.  A 
transit authority employee, like a token booth clerk or facility custodian, might similarly 
be positioned to recognize pre-operational reconnaissance of a subway station, or even an 
attack rehearsal.  A wholesale farming supply store clerk can identify bulk fertilizer 
purchases by customers who don’t quite resemble farmers or landscapers.  The specific 
odds are small that any single individual will witness terrorist indicators, but enlisting 
them as lookouts and educating them on what to look for expands the overall information 
input.  Unassociated observers may come forward in response to the public awareness 
campaign, or the police might recruit them individually as open contacts. 
2.  Proximal Outsiders 
Proximal outsiders are people tangentially affiliated with suspected terrorists, or 
who are in close proximity to them.  Fellow mosque congregants, neighbors, school 
classmates, co-workers or employers may all be able to observe the suspects’ behavior 
and report it to authorities.  Unlike unassociated observers, proximal outsiders are not 
necessarily placed near targets or material resources.  Rather, they enjoy placement near 
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the terrorist suspects themselves.  Police can handle such sources as either open contacts 
or confidential informants, depending on the level of risk involved with their reporting. 
3.  Detached Associates 
Terrorists cannot operate in a vacuum.  They require some measure of life support 
from their community, even from those people who may not support their violent agenda.  
Terrorists depend on direct and routine support from clerics, grocers or landlords to get 
along in daily life.  These detached associates enjoy ongoing access to the suspects, and 
if they do not endorse a terrorist cause, may prove to be willing recruits for police.  They 
normally will act as open contacts or confidential informants, again depending upon the 
frequency and intimacy of their contact with the suspects and the attendant risk they face 
in reporting to police. 
4.  Network Members 
An inside member of a terrorist organization is the Holy Grail of source 
recruitment.  Network members have a direct stake in the terrorist agenda as participants 
of some kind.  They may be actual terrorist operatives, such as bomb technicians, target 
scouts or attackers.  Or, they may directly support operatives as safe house proprietors, 
couriers, propagandists, trainers, radical imams or doctors who privately treat injured 
operatives.  Police who successfully turn a network member as a recruited source 
(commonly called a “flipped” source) enjoy very detailed operational information about 
the group—assuming the source is faithfully working for the police and not acting as a 
double agent.  Police should always handle a flipped source as a confidential informant, 
as the risks to the source and the police investigation are extreme. 
F.  SOURCE PLACEMENT 
A source’s access to information normally derives from the source’s placement 
with respect to terrorists or their activities.  Placement determines the type of sourcing 
operation his handlers will employ him for.   
One will generally find unassociated observers near a specific resource terrorists 
might need to acquire for operations, or near a potential asset the terrorists might target 
for an attack.  An unassociated observer may never see a terrorist.  However, the source 
serves as a watchman or a human alarm, poised to alert authorities in the event a 
suspected terrorist enters his area of observation. 
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Proximal outsiders may enjoy either resource-specific or suspect-specific 
placement.  Authorities recruit sources with resource-specific placement to report any 
indicators of emergent terrorist activity or presence.  Unlike unassociated observers, 
proximal outsiders—like mosque congregants or neighborhood residents—are positioned 
in places terrorists can be expected to emerge and establish a continuous presence, or 
even a base of operations.  Police may also levy proximal outsiders to observe specific 
people, in which case they enjoy suspect-specific placement.  Investigators may gather 
information on a suspected terrorist by directing his fellow congregants, neighbors, co-
workers or classmates to report on his activities. 
Detached associates may also have either resource-specific or suspect-specific 
access.  An imam, halal113 grocer, or employee at the university Islamic center are in a 
good position to identify any emergent radical elements in their midst, constituting 
resource-specific access.  (That is, they are positioned at a resource of which Islamist 
terrorists may routinely partake, be it religious services, Islamically appropriate 
foodstuffs or community fellowship.)  Police can brainstorm about what employment a 
terrorist scout might seek in order to gain access to potential targets, and then recruit 
sources within that job field.  For example, they may recruit a foreman at a construction 
firm doing maintenance on a high-profile landmark identified as an attractive target for 
terrorists.  The foreman can then report on any employees, or prospective employees, 
who appear more interested in details about the potential target than their assigned tasks.  
Thus, employers and potential employers represent good sources.  Additionally, police 
may levy these same sources to keep an eye on any suspect individuals previously 
identified.  The sources would, in such circumstances, have suspect-specific access. 
Recruited network members offer police direct insight into a terrorist organization 
and its members.  Therefore, their access is suspect-specific. 
The process of selecting sources with advantageous placement and access seems 
straightforward.  However, identifying good potential sources, not to mention actually 
recruiting them, becomes increasingly challenging when police officers must reach out to 
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an ethnic, immigrant community to find them.  Operating in an environment shrouded in 
a foreign culture requires savvy and subtlety. 
G.  SOURCING IN AN ETHNIC IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY 
1.  Reducing Fear, Building Trust 
Traditional ethnic, immigrant communities are those whose residents tend to 
adhere to social and cultural mores from their home of origin, and who have not fully 
assimilated into the mainstream American culture.  These sub-societies tend to be insular.  
The members may communicate primarily—or exclusively—in their native tongue, and 
limit their associations outside of the community.  Law enforcement officers serving a 
traditional ethnic, immigrant community must overcome the apparent cultural divide to 
be effective, particularly when attempting to enlist the community’s assistance with crime 
prevention or antiterrorism programs. 
Officers working with an immigrant community must understand the culture as 
well as possible.  Understanding the customs, fears and cultural taboos will help the 
officers interact properly with the neighborhood residents and sidestep potential 
misunderstandings or friction.  A woman immigrant from the Middle East may resist 
speaking with a male police officer, deferring to her husband; another may speak with the 
officer, but refuse to make eye contact.  An officer untrained in the cultural mores might 
read such behavior as deceptive, which might induce him to regard the woman with 
suspicion, or even list her mistakenly as a criminal suspect.   
When members of the police department recognize a community’s cultural 
nuances, the department can better plan its engagement.  Immigrants hailing from 
oppressive Middle Eastern regimes often regard plainclothed detectives with suspicion or 
fear, because plain clothes in the old country were the hallmark of the secret police, not 
detectives or criminal investigators.  Secret police represent the government’s heavy 
hand; they protect and serve the regime’s stability, not the citizenry.  Departments 
dealing with a traditional Arab immigrant enclave might do well to dispatch uniformed 
patrol officers to the neighborhood, rather than plainclothed detectives or agents.114   
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Sometimes Middle Eastern or Middle Asian men will refuse to deal with a female 
law enforcement officer, or will do so grudgingly, which might induce a department to 
exclude women officers from handling the neighborhood.  This shortsighted approach 
blinds the department to half the information available in the community.  When a man 
refuses to work with women officers, odds are the wife and the other women in his 
household will be reluctant to speak openly with male officers.  If they do speak with a 
male officer, the man of the house might insist on being present.  This naturally stifles 
any frank testimony on the women’s part, especially in incidents like domestic abuse.  A 
woman officer, however, may find inroads into the female population, not only 
uncovering criminal activity, but possibly identifying points of inquiry regarding 
terrorism or Islamic extremism.  For example, the patrol officers with a metropolitan 
police department had just undergone Middle Eastern cultural awareness training the day 
before.115  One patrol was dispatched to a domestic disturbance in a Middle Eastern 
household.  When the patrol officers arrived, they took a statement from the husband, but 
sensed the wife was withholding on her testimony.  They recognized the cultural issues at 
play, based on the previous day’s training, so they sent a female patrol officer the next 
day to speak with the wife while her husband was away at work.  The wife explained she 
and her husband had fought because he had fallen in with some bad elements at the 
mosque, and she was concerned he might jeopardize the life they had worked so hard to 
build in America.  This tidbit constituted a lead the police could further pursue to identify 
some potential radical Islamists.  
Law enforcement officials get “paid to be paranoid,” and they necessarily 
approach many aspects of investigative work with circumspection.  Nevertheless, officers 
must learn to disguise their suspicions and apprehensions to interact effectively with 
witnesses and suspects alike.  (Sometimes a detective does not want a criminal suspect to 
catch on too soon that he is under suspicion, lest it derail the investigation.)  Police 
should take a similar tack when they approach immigrant or minority communities, 
where the members may already feel uncomfortable with outside authority figures or the 
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larger American society.  This becomes especially important when pursuing criminal or 
terrorist elements who identify with a narrow ethnic or religious segment in society, 
because the radius of inquiry focuses on that small segment.  If the community feels 
threatened, it may circle the wagons and refuse to cooperate with the police, or at best do 
so reluctantly.  Not surprisingly, the carrot often yields better results than the stick. 
2.  Using the Stick 
The FBI’s approach to mass interviews of Arab-Americans and Muslim 
Americans in November 2001 portrayed an overarching sense of suspicion.  Many 
interviewees complained they felt the interviews were more akin to interrogations, and 
they felt the FBI agents treated them more as suspects than potential witnesses.  This 
alienated an important population segment that the country needed for its antiterrorism 
efforts.116  One can imagine the difficulties the FBI encountered later when it tried to 
recruit Arabic linguists into government service. 
Officers must carefully plan their interaction, bearing in mind cultural sensitivities 
and language barriers, to avoid alienating potential witnesses or sources of information.  
They can appeal to civic-minded members of the community to help identify criminal or 
terrorist elements in their midst—something that will benefit both the police and the 
community. 
3.  Using the Carrot117 
The members of a local Muslim congregation fell under intense scrutiny 
immediately following 11 September.  The outside community cast tremendous suspicion 
on them, and local authorities repeatedly approached the imam and demanded he identify 
any terrorists in his mosque.  The local police stationed patrol units on surveillance detail 
outside the mosque complex (including its community center and living quarters), 
essentially placing the community under quasi-house arrest. 
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The special agent-in-charge of a nearby federal investigative office sent an envoy 
of agents to the mosque, with specific instructions on how to approach the imam.  The 
agents arrived and told the imam they understood his congregants were catching a lot of 
unwarranted grief, and they asked him, “How are you guys holding up?  Is there anything 
we can do to help you?”  The imam replied that they were the first people to show any 
concern for his community, and the first to offer any assistance.  Up until that point, the 
local authorities approached the mosque with the apparent presumption the community 
was harboring terrorists.  In reality, the imam was more than eager to root out any bad 
apples in his midst, as they would only make life more difficult for his congregation.  The 
agents partnered with the imam on the spot, who used his extensive contacts through the 
greater Muslim community to identify any potential radicalism or terrorist leanings. 
4.  Finding the Focal Point 
Looking for sources can resemble prospecting for oil.  One can randomly drill, 
hoping to stumble upon a decent source.  Conversely, one can do a little research, find the 
right spot, and strike a gusher.  The imam at a local mosque can be a valuable ally in an 
antiterrorism campaign.  He can identify suspect newcomers who appear to espouse 
radical or violent views, or point out Salafist cliques.  The imam may also tell authorities 
about radical visiting clerics on speaking circuits, or suggest which other mosques and 
imams in the area have radical inclinations.   
Police may find other potential sources in the neighborhood outside of the mosque 
itself.  Traditional immigrant communities often import their social structure from the 
home region, crafting a neighborhood hierarchy that functions like a community 
government.  Traditional Middle Eastern immigrant neighborhoods usually model 
themselves like a village back home, with one clear leader.  The mukhtar (“the elected 
one”)118 serves as the village elder, working to maintain order in the neighborhood.  He 
helps resolve disputes, gets newcomers settled in, and may also monitor or guide the 
neighborhood’s interaction with the outside society.  Culture and language barriers 
heighten the importance of the mukhtar’s liaison function, since many immigrants need 
assistance setting up utilities, filing taxes, or getting a driver’s license. 
                                                 
118 Joseph Odisho, U.S. Government contract linguist, personal conversation during USAF Special 
Investigations Academy Critical Threat Counterintelligence Collections Course, 2005. 
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The mukhtar is normally an older male who has been in country for a number of 
years.  Strongly wired into his community, he knows all of the residents and knows more 
than anyone else what occurs in the neighborhood.  Thus, he represents the greatest 
potential source for police.  The mukhtar, if recruited, can be an invaluable resource.  
How can one identify the mukhtar?  Generally, he’s the first person anyone in the 
neighborhood calls in a crisis.  He’s the one they call before they dial 911.  And he is the 
man already on scene when the first responders arrive,119 either quietly observing or 
actively ensuring his constituents are properly cared for.  Antiterrorism investigators can 
train first responders, like patrol officers, firefighters and emergency medical technicians, 
on what to look for and how to identify the mukhtar.  Additionally, the first responders 
can ask the mukhtar for his contact information, which they can pass to the investigators 
so they may introduce themselves at a later time.  Alternatively, if a department has a 
branch of antiterrorism specialists, they may take rotations on call, responding to any 911 
call in a neighborhood of interest, so they may personally meet the mukhtar on scene and 
introduce themselves. 
A sourcing focal point, like an imam or mukhtar, will generally act as a source 
handler himself, essentially managing neighborhood residents as sub-sources, and then 
passing the information to the police.  Sometimes, however, he may introduce police 
officers to trusted members of the community, who in turn can become sources (either 
open contacts or confidential informants).  The focal point can help officers integrate 
with the neighborhood in setting up a community policing or neighborhood watch 
program.  As a trusted leader, the mukhtar or imam can personally introduce plainclothed 
officers to the neighborhood residents, thereby helping to overcome the immigrants’ 
inherent fear and mistrust of police in civilian clothes.  
Human intelligence lends itself well to preventive antiterrorism operations, and 
plays to the strengths of the law enforcement community.  Police routinely employ 
human informants in criminal investigative work.  Proper planning and training can help 
authorities readily adapt the tool to a new operational target and objective, giving them an 
edge in combating terrorism in their respective jurisdictions. 
                                                 
119 First Technologies, LLC., 16-17 September 2004. 
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IV.  ANTITERRORISM ANALYSIS FOR THE LAW 
ENFORCEMENT COMMUNITY: PUTTING THE PIECES 
TOGETHER 
Surprise attacks succeed when intelligence analysis fails.  From Pearl Harbor to 
11 September, post mortem investigations disclose that various people have clues 
pointing to an upcoming event, but nobody gathers all of the clues and assesses them to 
predict an attack.  Solid intelligence analysis underpins any effective antiterrorism 
program.  The goals of analysis are to learn about current terrorist methods and to predict 
their future actions—and thereby prevent an attack.  Understanding the terrorist 
methodology gives analysts insight into what steps terrorists must take in order to execute 
an attack, and those steps exhibit observable signatures, or indicators.  When field 
collectors recognize and report those indicators, the analysts can piece together a 
prediction of an impending terrorist operation. 
Analysts must be aware of certain tendencies in the human thought process—
assumptions and mental shortcuts—that can lead them to erroneous judgments.  They 
must also contend with another potential stumbling block: the tremendous volume of raw 
data they must comb through to extract relevant details and develop terrorist behavior 
patterns.  Fortunately, automated analytical systems can help.  They are not a stand-alone 
tool, however, as human analysts must interpret the computer’s findings.  
 The global jihad’s dispersed nature imposes certain structural requirements on 
antiterrorism analysis that span from local to national-level efforts.  Al-Qaeda and the 
other participants in the global jihad have demonstrated the ability to run operations 
against similar targets in different localities (or even different countries).  This 
phenomenon may be the result of operational design, as in al-Qa’eda’s simultaneous 
attacks on separate targets, or simply the result of imitation and collaboration between 
geographically separated, semi-autonomous cells.  In either case, jihadi activities may 
exhibit patterns that are only evident at a regional or national level.  Law enforcement 
analysts in a local jurisdiction cannot see the larger patterns of terrorist activity across a 
wider geographic area; observers at a regional or national level are better suited to 
recognize a dispersed pattern.  Conversely, analysts at higher echelons have no visibility 
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of localized events unless the local jurisdictions pass the information up to them.  Finally, 
local departments often lack the resources and training to field an effective analytical 
capability, thus placing a heavier load on regional and national analysts.120  Properly 
structuring law enforcement analytic units can help tie local, regional and national assets 
and information together to form an effective antiterrorism intelligence cooperative. 
A. A LOST ART 
Police departments and law enforcement agencies across the nation are striving to 
gather information about threats, with emphasis on training officers about pre-operational 
indicators and clues of terrorist activity, and with a strong push toward recruiting 
informants.  Intelligence collection constitutes the first step in the proactive terrorism 
counteraction chain, but all that information adds little value if it isn’t analyzed to 
ascertain its significance and put it into a larger context.  Intelligence analysis makes 
collected information useful and gives it meaning.  The analyzed intelligence (called 
finished intelligence) ultimately informs a battery of intelligence consumers—policy 
makers, resource owners, enforcement officers and field collectors alike.  Analysis, 
employed properly, helps craft suitable defensive measures to meet the terrorist threat, 
assists investigators to develop investigative plans, enables enforcement and disruption 
operations, and provides structure to ongoing intelligence collections.  Consequently, for 
any organization confronting terrorism, including law enforcement, a properly formulated 
terrorism counteraction program necessitates a solid, structured analytic underpinning.  
Unfortunately, police departments and larger law enforcement organizations alike usually 
lack the resources to recruit and properly train analysts in the science—and art—of 
intelligence assessment; even the national Intelligence Community faces these 
challenges.  Furthermore, the analytical process often stands far removed from the action 
in the field or on the street, so it remains under-appreciated, misunderstood and often 
neglected…until something goes wrong. 
B. INTELLIGENCE FAILURES: EYE ON ANALYSIS 
Pundits liken 9/11 to Pearl Harbor.  Both represent watershed events for 
America’s Intelligence Community; both have been labeled catastrophic “intelligence 
failures.”  The Pearl Harbor attack ultimately precipitated the National Security Act of 
                                                 
120 Brian Michael Jenkins, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), pp. 164-167. 
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1947, which established the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US Intelligence 
Community, all elements of which were subordinated to the Director of Central 
Intelligence (DCI).  All intelligence agencies were supposed to follow the DCI’s 
direction to ensure a national unity of effort in intelligence matters, and all collected 
national-level intelligence thenceforth flowed through the CIA to ensure it could be 
centrally analyzed to prevent another surprise attack.  Nearly sixty years later, America 
had its second Pearl Harbor, and the 9/11 Commission subsequently recommended 
assigning a national intelligence director over the Intelligence Community to ensure unity 
of effort and centralized analysis.121  (The only difference between the DCI as established 
by the National Security Act of 1947, and the new director proposed by the 
Commission—now called the Director of National Intelligence, or DNI—is the titular 
head of the Intelligence Community would be divorced from the CIA.  The National 
Security Act previously charged the DCI with dual responsibilities as the head of the CIA 
and the leader of the overall Intelligence Community.)   
Just what was the “intelligence failure” in each case?  Some people might suggest 
the Intelligence Community did not have enough information to forecast the attacks.  
This is not necessarily so.  The 9/11 failure mirrors past intelligence shortcomings in 
which the U.S. has been caught off-guard by adversaries.  Michael Handel contends that 
“past failures in avoiding surprise cannot be blamed on a dearth of information and 
warning signs.  Consequently, one must look to the levels of analysis and [policymaker] 
acceptance [of intelligence] for an answer.”122  There were indications of impending 
Japanese hostilities prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor, but the U.S. intelligence elements 
lacked the necessary coordination or analysis to recognize them.123  The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation had specific information before September 2001 concerning Arabs, 
possibly linked to Osama bin Laden, taking pilot lessons in the U.S.; the absence of 
                                                 
121 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States, authorized edition [paperback] (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., [2004]) 
pp. 399-400, 411-415. 
122 Michael I. Handel, “Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise,” in Paradoxes of Strategic 
Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, eds. Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken 
(Portland, OR: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), p. 8. 
123 Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence, 
3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, Inc., 2002), p. 161. 
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timely distribution and centralized evaluation of these disparate reports made headlines 
after the “Phoenix Memo” became public.124  Raw information was available in both 
cases.  U.S. Air Force intelligence analyst Sundri Khalsa asserts, “Warning failures are 
rarely due to inadequate collection [and] are more frequently due to weak analysis.”125  
The raw information was not properly centrally analyzed to develop patterns and trends 
that might suggest impending attacks.  The Intelligence Community—and the law 
enforcement community—lacked sufficient predictive analysis to yield a warning.  
Above all else, threat warning represents the most visible and salient goal of intelligence 
analysis.  
C.  BROAD GOALS OF TERRORISM ANALYSIS 
Mark Kauppi, a program manager for the Counterterrorism Training Program at 
the Defense Intelligence Agency, says that terrorism intelligence analysis “aims to 
improve our understanding of terrorist activities (what they do), their motivation (why 
they do what they do) and organizational associations (how they are organized to carry 
out their activities).”126  The desired end result is a greater awareness of the terrorist 
threats, the disruption or neutralization of terrorist activities and organizations, and 
advanced forecasting and warning of impending attacks.127  Kauppi insists this last 
service, the warning of attacks, is the analyst’s “number one job.”  Analysis yields “three 
levels of warning.  Most important is tactical level warning,” which is time-sensitive 
(usually within hours or days) and target-target specific, sometimes with details about the 
method of attack.  Operational level warning is less specific regarding location (perhaps 
only narrowed down to a geographic region) or attack details and covers a time window 
of weeks or months.  Strategic warning is very general and covers a timeframe from 
several months to several years.128 
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Precisely what is this mystical process called “intelligence analysis”?  Webster’s 
dictionary defines it as the “separation of a whole into its component parts,” or “an 
examination of a complex, its elements, and their relations.”129  Analysis is at times the 
process of breaking down collected information for examination, and alternately 
assembling the various pieces “into something that is usable by” a given consumer.130  
An analyst must often deal with uncertainty introduced by incomplete or imperfect 
information.  Therefore, judgment becomes a crucial component of his intelligence 
assessments,131 whereby he weighs evidence (collected data) and forms estimates of what 
he believes represents reality.  The pictures the analyst paints include descriptions of 
present reality and predictions of potential future events.  Each class of analytical product 
serves different purposes. 
D.  ILLUSTRATING THE PRESENT 
A terrorism analyst first educates his customers by framing the world in an 
understandable fashion.  He takes pieces of collected information and crafts a picture—
often a “best guess” picture founded on incomplete information—that describes or 
explains terrorist phenomena and threats.  Case studies on terrorist groups and incidents 
provide insight into their methods, resources, personnel and capabilities.  Their 
documents and rhetoric further elucidate their methods, intentions and mindset.   
Viewing the intelligence picture over time, an analyst hopes to identify patterns—
hallmarks that consistently manifest themselves whenever a certain process or series of 
events occurs.  Kauppi explains, “A pattern is simply repeated behavior over time.”132  
Patterns often derive from examining a broad sweep of field reports and previous, 
relevant analytical products; the analyst seeks out repetition in the details.  Once an 
analyst identifies a pattern, changes in that pattern become easier to recognize.  Such a 
“change in the pattern of behavior” is called a trend.133  “[Identifying] a group’s pattern 
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of behavior is imperative in order to establish a baseline of how terrorists go about doing 
what they do…the traditional modus operandi or pattern of terrorist activities….”134   
The analyst can dissect case studies, training documents and doctrinal materials to 
piece together a particular group’s modus operandi.  He can formulate the MO into a 
model his customers—patrolmen, investigators, security professionals and policy 
makers—can use to inform their operations and decisions. 
Outlining a terrorist group’s MO, the analyst helps investigators plan their 
investigations and operations by giving them insight into their target (the terrorist group), 
and more specifically, potential vulnerabilities in the terrorist planning and attack 
cycle.135  The MO can also point them toward potential sources of information or 
investigative leads to pursue. 
A detailed MO also informs policy makers and those responsible for securing 
public or private sector resources.  The resource security managers, once knowledgeable 
of the possible methods of attack, can devise defensive plans and countermeasures, 
weighing the risks against the defensive measures’ potential costs.136  The risk 
assessment depends significantly on the analyst’s threat picture, that is, the evaluation of 
the threat posed by terrorists: their preferred attack methods and attendant capabilities 
(their MO), their goals and intentions, plus an estimate of the likelihood that they will 
attack a specific target or set of targets.137  Herein the analyst parlays the current 
intelligence picture into a prediction of possible future terrorist events. 
E.  PREDICTING THE FUTURE 
Crystal balls are in short supply, and they don’t work very well anyway, so an 
analyst must seize other means to peek into the future.  Forecasting terrorist events 
arguably overshadows all other analytical functions, since the failure to anticipate an 
attack carries grave consequences.  Threat warning is a product of indications and 
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warning, or I&W, intelligence.  I&W derives from tactical collection of discrete 
indicators combined with trend analysis.  The process points to future developments and 
puts the incoming indicator data into context.   
An indicator is some piece of information (normally an observable event) that 
points to a step in a process.138  An indicator resembles a box in a checklist; once an 
event is observed that corresponds to an indicator, it is called an indication.139  Khalsa 
notes, “Indications are activities that have happened that fall into one of the indicator 
categories” (emphasis hers).140  Indicators help analysts “diagnose a decision, condition, 
or process”141 which a terrorist entity undertakes.  For indicators to be useful, they must 
represent behavior or events that manifest themselves predictably and repeatedly any 
time a given process occurs.142  In other words, they must show fidelity to an established 
pattern an analyst has previously discerned about terrorist activity.  Likewise, indicators 
must be observable to serve their function; if a terrorist process includes a secret step that 
field collectors will never see, it has no value as an indicator.143  It’s a box on the 
checklist that will never be marked. 
The analyst interpolates indicators from a model of a terrorist process (e.g., a 
given group’s preferred attack method).  They can deduce indicators from:   
 
• Steps the terrorists must take to complete the process; 
• Previous incidents and behavior attributed to the group; 
• Actions that cannot be circumvented, such as crossing a border or 
approaching the target; 
• Terrorist group rhetoric, statements or doctrine; 
• Training programs or training materials; 
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• People with knowledge about the process, such as inside informants or 
observers.144  
 
The indicators, listed as a sequence of discrete, consecutive events, effectively 
establish a timeline for the analyst.145  As the analyst annotates the occurrence of 
indications (events that have happened and have been observed), he can establish how far 
along the chain of events a terrorist group has progressed, and what future events, 
represented by indicators, one can expect to be forthcoming.  This forecasting constitutes 
the warning portion of the I&W process.  The following example depicts a hypothetical 
indicator sequence. 
F.  TERRORIST ATTACK PROCESS INDICATOR SEQUENCE 
The Al-Qa’eda attack process (derived from the Military Studies in the Jihad against the 
Tyrants)146 follows: 
 
1)  Research and reconnaissance phase 
 a)  Visual reconnaissance or surveillance of target* 
 b)  Checking time of certain events (i.e., checking watch)* 
 
2)  Planning phase 
 a)  Draft plans 
 b)  Discuss plans with team members (team meeting)* 
 c)  Modify plans as required 
 
3) Execution phase 
 a)  Pre-deploy attackers and/or weapons to staging area* 
 b)  Confirmatory target reconnaissance or surveillance* 
 c)  Deploy attackers and/or weapons to attack site* 
d)  Activate weapon (i.e., draw firearm or actuate detonator)* 
                                                 
144 McCreary. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants [a.k.a. The al-Qa’eda Terrorist Training Manual 
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The steps marked with asterisks (*) constitute indicators because they represent 
steps that are collectable, although gaining access to some of them may require 
penetration of the cell by technical means or an informant. 
The indicator chain would look like this: 
 
 
Figure 2 Indicator Chain 
 
A field collector reports hostile surveillance of a power plant.  The analyst notes it 
on the indicator sequence: 
 
 
Figure 3 Indicator Chain – Reconnaissance 
 
A subsequent report advises that a hostile surveillant was seen checking his watch 




Figure 4 Indicator Chain – Time Check 
 
Yet another report comes in that suggests new people have arrived in the local 
area, and known Islamists were observed moving crates into a self-storage unit a mile 
from the power plant.  It appears collectors have not been able to gather any information 
on a possible team meeting, but the sequence of events has become evident to the analyst.  
He advises the field collectors to stay attuned to a possible re-emergence of 
reconnaissance or surveillance around the plant.  They are now looking for the next 
indicator in the chain. 
 
 
Figure 5 Indicator Chain – Staging 
 
The officers report another round of surveillance.  The analyst forecasts an attack 





Figure 6 Indicator Chain – Forecast 
 
G.  THE ANALYSIS PROCESS 
Intelligence production constitutes an iterative process wherein the players 
interact and coordinate their functions.  A good analyst will work with field collectors 
and guide their collection activities.  The analyst should first ascertain what intelligence 
he needs concerning the terrorist threat picture to support his various consumers.  He then 
assesses what information he has, and what information he lacks (called an intelligence 
gap), in addressing the intelligence needs.  The analyst levies the collectors with 
categories of information they ought to gather, or simply, collection requirements.  
Examples might include “terrorist safe house information,” “terrorist weapons and 
tactics,” or “vehicle data.”  Specific details to acquire, such as names, vehicle models and 
colors, license plate numbers, telephone numbers or addresses, are called interrogatories.  
Together, these levies constitute an intelligence shopping list for the field collectors.  
(Patrol officers and investigators represent the law enforcement community’s field 
collectors.)   
As the collectors gather information and submit field reports, the analyst provides 
feedback on the quality and relevance of the intelligence, advises on how to sustain or 
improve the quality, and suggests where to focus future collection efforts.147  The 
intelligence consumers, likewise, should reciprocate with feedback on the value of the 
finished (i.e., analyzed) intelligence the analyst produces.   
This resembles a simplified version of the national Intelligence Community’s 
intelligence cycle.148  The intelligence consumers—government officials or other 
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decision makers who rely on intelligence to formulate policy and strategy—ideally work 
in the planning and direction phase, advising the intelligence elements what kind of 
intelligence they want produced.  Field collectors gather information during the collection 
phase and, in the processing phase, translate (or collate) it into a format the analyst can 
readily use, normally a field report.  The analyst receives and assesses the field reports, 
churning out finished analytical products in the analysis and production phase.  He 
provides feedback to the collectors about the quality of the information they’ve gathered, 
as described above.  The analyst then delivers the finished intelligence assessments to the 
consumers in the dissemination phase.  Again, feedback comes into play, only this time 
it’s from the consumers, evaluating the quality of the finished intelligence the analyst 
produced.  Then the cycle begins anew, with the consumers re-examining what 
intelligence they have and what intelligence they still need to support their decisions.  
Figure 7 depicts the intelligence cycle. 
 
 
Figure 7 The Intelligence Cycle 
 
Law enforcement intelligence operations, especially at state level and below, will 
generally find the intelligence actors sharing roles, and fulfilling multiple roles, across the 
cycle’s various phases.  Local consumers of law enforcement intelligence will normally 
demand more direct analyst involvement in the planning and direction phase to help them 
determine their intelligence needs, and to articulate them as sensible collection 
requirements and interrogatories for the field collectors.  Day-to-day consumers will not 
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be limited to public officials, but will include community business owners, industrial 
security managers, patrol officers and police investigators.  Meanwhile, police officers, as 
field collectors, need analytical products to plan further collections; in their enforcement 
role, they’ll use them to plan investigations and operations, such as raids or arrests.  Thus, 
they are both collectors and consumers.   
H.  THE SCIENCE OF ANALYSIS 
Finished intelligence reports are not mere compilations of raw field data.  The 
analyst imbues the information with meaning and context by fitting it into a construct that 
explains a given phenomenon, like al-Qa’eda’s operational workings.  Such insights 
traditionally derive from an historical evaluation of terrorist groups and their behavior.  
The construct is a mental model the analyst uses to examine and evaluate a terrorist group 
or process; it is how he perceives the terrorists and their behavior as drawn from the 
patterns he has devised from his research.  The mental model frames how the analyst 
evaluates future field reports on the terrorist enterprise.  The model itself may be either 
explicit or implicit, depending on which approach the analyst employs.149 
The first is the cognitive analytical approach.  In this case, the mental model is 
implicit, not explicit.  The analyst may have to construct a model from scratch if 
evaluating a new phenomenon (a new group, new MO, etc.).  This approach is more 
intuitive and qualitative.150 
The second is the data-driven analytical approach, which uses an explicit, 
previously defined model into which incoming data are introduced to generate a 
conclusion.151  Indications and warning analysis, with its checklist and fill-in-the-blank 
methodology, follows a data-driven approach.   
One must exercise caution with mental models.  A model remains subject to 
change, either because new intelligence becomes available that contradicts it, or because 
real conditions change and render the model obsolete.  The global jihad continues to 
evolve and al-Qa’eda’s operations tomorrow will probably differ from its operations of 
yesterday.  One need only look to Iraq, the new jihadi training ground, to see how quickly 
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the insurgents adapt their tactics to challenge the Coalition forces.  An analyst must 
accept that his mental model will be a temporary construct, and he must be vigilant for 
signs of its decreasing validity.  He cannot stay wedded to an older model once it 
becomes obsolete.  Unfortunately, humans are loath to change their perception of how the 
world works; even analysts resist change.152  Stubborn adherence to a given mental 
model may constitute a bias, a preconceived outlook that bears directly on an analyst’s 
effectiveness. 
An analyst will confront many types of bias, but four warrant special mention.  
All interact closely when the analyst tackles terrorism, potentially skewing his analytic 
judgments.  The first bias induces analysts to seek out cause-and-effect relationships 
between observed events.153  An analyst faced with coincidental and unconnected events 
might misconstrue a causative relationship, recommending ineffective solutions.  The 
same can be said for related events with a common cause, but have no causative 
relationship between themselves.  In a medical example, doctors used to believe inflamed 
tonsils caused severely sore throats, and removed the tonsils as the presumed cure.  The 
tonsils, in fact, swell as a result of the infection which simultaneously causes a sore 
throat; tonsils actually serve as defense organs that protect against infection.  The cases in 
which they become inflamed are instances where the infection overwhelms the tonsils’ 
defenses.  The doctors of yesteryear mistakenly attributed a cause-and-effect relationship 
between two concurrent phenomena. 
The analyst is secondly inclined to presume a given group’s actions or behaviors 
are intentional outcomes of centralized planning.154  If a terrorist operative boards a bus 
with an explosive satchel and the device detonates, killing the terrorist and the other 
passengers, an analyst is strongly inclined to presume the operative (1) specifically 
targeted that bus (2) on orders from his group’s leaders, and (3) that he intended to 
execute a suicide attack.  The terrorist, in reality, might have simply received orders to 
attack any target of his choice, elected to leave a time-bomb at the airport, and was  
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simply riding the bus to his target when the satchel prematurely exploded.  Consequently, 
it would be specious for the analyst to conclude the terrorist group is targeting commuter 
buses with suicide bombers. 
A centrally controlled, hierarchical model is alluring because it characterizes the 
group as a single, unitary—and presumably rational155—actor that has a single command 
element (the “brain”).  Such an organization is easier to defeat, contain or control than an 
amorphous, decentralized collective, making it a more palatable adversary; conceptually, 
this model “is convenient and reassuring”156 for the analyst and policy maker alike.157  
One can study and anticipate a logical adversary’s behavior.  Any randomness thrown in 
the mix threatens the accuracy and efficacy of the analytical prediction, which in turn 
makes an analyst uncomfortable.  Al-Qa’eda today resembles more of a decentralized 
movement than a hierarchical organization, particularly following the U.S. military 
operations in Afghanistan.  One could characterize al-Qa’eda post-2001 as a “venture 
capitalist” terrorist enterprise that grants seed money for semi-independent terrorist 
operations,158 or a transnational terrorist franchise that adopts pre-existing groups under 
its umbrella.159  A broad-based, decentralized movement will exhibit a higher degree of 
randomness in its behavior than a unitary organization.  The absence of a safe haven 
replete with training camps, compounded by limited communications with bin Laden’s 
central command element, has devolved al-Qa’eda’s operations.  Geographically 
dispersed cells and operatives of varying skill levels and resources will plan and execute 
attacks that may deviate from the “standard” al-Qa’eda model,160 so the analyst must 
anticipate some degree of randomization.   Such an anticipation, however, may induce a 
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third type of bias, one that has recently gained prominence in the antiterrorism 
community.  It stands as the antithesis to the centralization bias. 
Since al-Qa’eda lost its Afghan safe haven, many analysts regard the Islamist 
global jihad as a completely decentralized network, devoid of any significant command 
structure or hierarchical elements.  The global network paradigm has garnered champions 
throughout the counterterrorism community, academia and the public policy arena.161  
The network concept, however, demands a nuanced analytical approach, one that is often 
ignored in public discourse in favor of broad generalizations.  Such generalizations about 
networks—generalizations that conflate networked structure with the concept of 
decentralization—can foster an incomplete understanding of the complex terrorist 
apparatus and yield imprudent counterterrorism policy options and terrorism 
countermeasures.   
Assertions that al-Qa’eda has become a dispersed, decentralized network are 
overly simplistic and ignore the uneven nature of the global jihad and its participants.  Al-
Qa’eda may have decentralized after 2001, but not necessarily to a uniform degree across 
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the whole organization.  Parts of the old guard—the High Command, the central core—
remains as a hierarchical entity, as do some outlying cells and affiliated groups.  The 
central leadership still strives to direct the operations and manage the behavior of its 
subordinate cells and affiliates.  The level of control that it wields varies across the 
network, contingent on how tightly connected the core is to the respective cells.  When 
analysts predispose themselves to regard the jihadi network as fully decentralized, or 
even leaderless, they may fail to recognize key cells or individuals (called nodes in the 
network) that exert greater-than-average influence on terrorist activities.  Key nodes may 
include ideologues, terrorist organizational leaders, financiers, logistical facilitators, or 
even heads of sympathetic states.  Targeting critical nodes in the network may reduce its 
effectiveness, hinder its communications, or even thwart an attack.  Sometimes isolating 
a key member from the rest of the network (see Figure 8) may force the apparatus to 
adapt by activating redundancies—new, substitute nodes that analysts had not previously 
identified (as in Figure 9), or new links between nodes to get around the imposed 









Figure 9 Newly Activated, Previously Unknown Node 
 
 
Figure 10 Newly Activated, Redundant Link 
 
The decentralization bias can improperly influence how analysts map a part of a 
terrorist network.  Intelligence reports may identify cells or individual actors as network 
nodes, and the relations between them as links, but the analyst must understand the 
substance of the links to assign relative importance to the nodes.  One node linked to 
many others may appear important—a key node worthy of targeting for removal or 
isolation—but the links may be trivial in value, while another node, seemingly remote 
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from the network, may exert stronger influence on the terrorist apparatus as a whole.  For 
example, senior al-Qa’eda ideologue Mustafa Setmariam Nasar, alias Abu Mus’ab al-
Suri, has only one known link to the al-Qa’eda apparatus.  His apparent disconnectedness 
originally led analysts to underestimate his importance.162  The substance of a node’s 
links to the network may identify him as a central power broker, perhaps even a chief in a 
hierarchical terrorist organization, that makes him a worthy counterterrorism target.   
In other cases, the hard-core terrorist apparatus may rely on peripherally 
connected individuals or groups to provide crucial services, such as transfer funds or 
materiel on the terrorists’ behalf.  Such individuals, while playing an important role in the 
network’s function, may have weak or even ambiguous loyalties to the jihadi cause.  
Authorities may be able to co-opt them, wittingly or otherwise, in order to impede 
network operations.  Authorities may also exploit identified cleavages between different 
cooperating sub-groups with competing parochial agendas.  Analysts can recognize these 
sub-groups by considering the terrorist network is not necessarily an amorphous, 
leaderless enterprise.  An organization need not function exclusively as either a 
decentralized network or a centralized hierarchy.  John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt and 
Brian Jackson of RAND support this paradigm.  Arquilla and Ronfeldt note that in 
“hybrids of network and hierarchical forms of organization…traditional hierarchies may 
exist inside particular nodes in a network.”163  Jackson highlights the violent 
environmentalist movement, which appears at the national level to be a leaderless, 
loosely connected network.  Yet individual “cells within the movement…will have their 
own authority structures with much tighter [interconnectedness].”164  Marc Sageman’s 
analysis of the pre-9/11 global jihad network indicates the Southeast Asian cluster 
(Jemaah Islamiya, or Islamic Group) represented more of a hierarchy than the other 
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elements.165  Ultimately, an analyst must walk a balance beam between the two biases of 
seeing things as purely hierarchical, or seeing them as completely decentralized.  Either 
predisposition will blind the analyst to exploitable, subtle details in the global jihad. 
The popular paradigm of a decentralized global network presents a noteworthy 
pitfall.  Arquilla and Ronfeltd introduce a concept called network-centric warfare, or 
“netwar,” in which they describe how a hostile, decentralized network can execute 
coordinated attacks.  They, along with Michele Zanini and Sean J.A. Edwards, argue the 
best way to combat a decentralized amalgam waging network warfare is to employ 
decentralized netwar in response.166   Arquilla and Ronfeldt further propose a shift “away 
from notions of ‘central’ intelligence” toward intelligence networks, modeled off the 
success of business networks, wherein critical information can flow quickly between 
different subordinate elements.167  They seem to suggest that “central” intelligence 
somehow equates to vertical channeling at the expense of broad dissemination.  Indeed, 
horizontal information sharing has its merits, but should not constitute a substitute for 
aggregated intelligence pooling and analysis.  The 9/11 Commission recognized that 
centralized analysis is critical to recognizing patterns among isolated pieces of raw 
intelligence.   
Ironically, the mandate to “connect the dots” draws the analysts toward yet a 
fourth bias, the tendency to see patterns in purely random phenomena.  The human mind 
instinctively seeks order.  It attempts to frame the world in a logical way, and will “easily 
misconstrue random events as nonrandom, perceiving a pattern where, in fact, none 
exists.”168  By construing patterns, the mind can adapt to the world, reacting in 
established ways to circumstances that resemble familiar ones from past experience.  This 
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way the mind doesn’t have to evaluate each situation in detail, but can apply mental 
shortcuts to select behaviors that proved effective in similar, past situations.169  These 
mental shortcuts normally serve humans well, but they can prove dangerous for the 
intelligence analyst. 
Intelligence consumers expect the analyst to identify patterns in the chaos of raw 
field reporting.  After all, discerning the pattern is the first step in the analytic process, 
the bedrock of finished intelligence assessments.  Consumer expectations, combined with 
the natural bias, can lead analysts to find non-existent patterns in truly random events, 
which could foster erroneous intelligence judgments and predictions.  The terrorism 
analyst must remain acutely cognizant of this natural mental bias.  Perhaps the best way 
to minimize its effects is to seek data that do not fit the pattern; when enough information 
falls outside the perceived pattern, the analyst may conclude the behavior or events under 
consideration are indeed random.  If he cannot find enough evidence to discredit the 
pattern, the analyst can improve his confidence that an actual pattern does exist.  
Precisely how much data the analyst will need to make such a determination is really up 
to the analyst, contingent on how much overall information is available.  A larger sample 
of data (such as numerous case studies) will help lift true patterns above the random 
clutter.170   
I.  THE VOLUME CHALLENGE  
Making more information available to analysts doesn’t always yield better 
intelligence assessments.  Richards J. Heuer, Jr., conducted extensive research into the 
methodologies and psychological underpinnings of intelligence analysis during his tenure 
at the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence.  He highlights studies which suggest an 
intelligence analyst’s “judgments are determined by a few dominant factors, rather than 
by the systematic integration of all available information.”171  Once an analyst has 
formed his estimate from a given set of evidence, additional information won’t  
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necessarily improve its quality, but will increase his confidence in the estimate (unless 
the additional information discredits his initial analysis, in which case the analyst’s 
confidence should decrease).172  
While offering an analyst more information may not contribute to better analysis; 
it may foster the opposite effect. The 9/11 intelligence failure, from the standpoint of 
inadequate analysis, highlighted a major obstacle analysts face in the Intelligence 
Community.  Part of the problem stemmed from the tremendous volume of available 
information.  The Intelligence Community gathers thousands of field reports daily on 
topics ranging from Chinese military capabilities, to economic developments in Nigeria, 
to terrorist activities in Colombia.  The law enforcement community, even less 
interconnected than the national Intelligence Community, gathers information from 
countless crime reports and investigative activities, only some of which can rightly be 
labeled intelligence.  Trying to sift through mountains of seemingly disconnected data 
and trying to find substantive links is a daunting challenge.  The post-9/11 inquiries 
suggested the “first issue in intelligence gathering focuses…on the sheer volume of 
information.”  Today within the law enforcement and intelligence communities, “the 
simple fact is there is too much information [which] is useless unless it is analyzed.”173   
An analyst must sort through high volumes of raw intelligence reporting, 
attempting to extract relevant details of information from disparate sources and field 
reports, while simultaneously digesting it all as a coherent whole so as to discern larger 
patterns or detect anomalies.  This has been called the “wheat versus chaff” problem, 
where the analyst attempts to winnow choice morsels of information (“wheat”) from a 
larger body of extraneous data (“chaff”).  The phenomenon has also been dubbed the 
“signal versus noise” challenge; the information that may contribute to the analysis, or 
“signal,” hides amidst a much larger “noise” volume of lesser value.174  
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J.  AUTOMATED ANALYTICS AND DATA MINING 
Information databases and computerized analytical algorithms (called analytics) 
provide analysts a powerful tool in predictive analysis, especially when facing a data 
overload. Automated data processing systems can evaluate significant volumes of 
information stored in multiple databases, and do so quickly.  This process of cross-
referencing data elements to discern patterns, links and associations is called data mining.  
Information databases can be extremely large and complex.  Combing various databases 
and performing link analysis between all the data points might take a human analyst 
weeks, while a computer could do it in minutes.  “With data mining,” notes Colleen 
McCue of the Research Triangle Institute, “we can perform exhaustive searches of very 
large databases using automated methods, searching well beyond the capacity of human 
analysts or even a team of analysts.”175 
Automated programs need a human analyst to feed the system properly.  Field 
collectors (patrolmen or plain-clothed investigators) submit field reports to a central 
clearinghouse.  The analyst therein must sift through the reports and extract pertinent data 
that fit categories in the analytic database.  He must then translate those data into a usable 
format for the computer system and input them.  An analytic database is generally unable 
to extract the appropriate data directly from the field report.  The analyst must interpret 
the report for the system.176  He feeds various data fields in the system, such as location, 
time, subjects’ names, and passport information (country of origin, date and place of 
issue, passport number—whatever the officer gathered for his field report).  Automated 
data mining systems pool disparate pieces of information, giving the analyst ready access 
to all of it in one place.  An automated search can identify the data commonalities 
between different databases—a potentially difficult and time-consuming process for a 
human analyst.  Appendix C illustrates how such a process should work. 
Computerized analytical algorithms offer another advantage in that they are 
normally free from cognitive bias.177  Computers perform numerical calculations.  
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Human analysts tend to employ qualitative judgments, which rely on intuition and 
therefore are more susceptible to cognitive bias.  If an analyst can design an analytical 
model using quantitative inputs, a computer can arguably generate more accurate results 
than intuitive cognitive approaches.178  Essentially, computers excel at data-driven 
analysis.  Critical for their accuracy, though, are a solid conceptual model and accurate 
data inputs with appropriately assigned quantitative values.  
Programmers have recently developed software uniquely suited to terrorism 
analysis, particularly regarding Islamist terrorism.  Ordinary databases have limited 
capability to detect potential name variations and link them to a given person.  Arabic 
names179 can transliterate into multiple romanized forms, as illustrated by the humorous 
truism that Muammar Kaddafi can be spelled two thousand different ways.  Terrorist 
operatives have used this to advantage by altering their names for different documents, 
thereby masking their movements and identities.  Consider, for example, the name of this 
obscure Saudi Arabian terrorist: 
 
Osama bin Laden 
 
His name, broken down, is:  
 
Osama (given name) bin (“son of”) Laden (surname) 
 
A more complete rendition would be:  
 
Osama bin (“son of”) Muhammad (father’s given name) bin (“son of”) Laden 
 
A full rendition would be: 
 
Osama bin Muhammad bin Laden al-Yemeni (tribal origin, literally, “the 
Yemeni”) 
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Numerous permutations are acceptable, as bin can also be written ibn, and as it is 
extraneous, it can be left off altogether: 
 
Osama ibn Muhammad ibn Laden al-Yemeni 
Osama Muhammad Laden al-Yemeni 
 
Further permutations include Osama Laden, Osama Muhammed Laden, Osama al-
Yemeni, etc.  Variations in romanization yield even more alias possibilities: 
 
Usama bin Muhamed bin Ladin, Osama ibn Mohammed ibn Laden el-Yemeni, etc. 
 
A wily operative may enter the country on a passport as Osama bin Laden al-Yemeni, 
obtain a student ID card as Osama B. Laden, and apply for a driver’s license as Usama A. 
Yemeni (since the driver’s license only has three name fields in which to fit five apparent 
names: Osama Bin Laden Al Yemeni). 
Special software can cross-reference name databases.  An algorithm identifies 
potential name permutations that may link to one or more individuals.180  It then flags the 
data for the analyst, who may initiate an investigative follow-up.  If multiple name 
variants seem linked to one individual, it may indicate possible deception on his part: he 
might have changed his name’s appearance to hide his activities.  Not surprisingly, the 
9/11 Commission found that the nineteen hijackers had used 364 aliases between them, 
some of which included “different spellings of their names.”181  
The 9/11 hijackers used a time-proven technique to avoid detection by authorities.  
In 1990, Egyptian Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman,182 known as the “blind sheikh,” used a 
name variant on his I-94 immigration entry form to visit the United States.  (It was a 
variation of the name on his passport.)  Three weeks earlier, the Immigration and 
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Naturalization Service had watchlisted Rahman in the National Automated Immigrant 
Lookout System (NAILS), but the system was unable to reconcile the name on the I-94 
with the one in the database, because the “watchlist needed an almost exact name match” 
to flag him.183  The State Department later instituted a name-matching system to avoid a 
repeat of the “Blind Sheikh episode.”  The State Department developed a “language 
algorithm…for Arabic, [and] implemented [it] in December 1998. This enabled the 
system [to] search its records for all variant spellings of, for example, the name 
‘Mohammed.’”184  (Unfortunately, a proprietary system equipped with such software, 
used by only one federal department, provides little security against operatives who use 
name variants to apply for state driver’s licenses, rent apartments, open utilities accounts 
or enroll in flight schools, and are thereby able to melt untraceably into society.) 
Automated analytic tools represent a powerful asset in an analyst’s arsenal, but 
one must caution against relying too heavily on computers at the expense of human 
involvement.  A computer data-mining algorithm can identify patterns and linkages—
even trends—but it cannot ascertain the significance of such findings.  The skilled human 
analyst must put it all into context.185  
K.  STRUCTURING LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS 
FOR ANTITERRORISM 
Police departments lucky enough to have a narcotics, gang or organized crime 
unit often enjoy a pre-existing analytical capability, since these types of crime generally 
involve a continual management of criminal intelligence.  A truly robust analytical 
capability, however, takes more than skilled individuals in a single police department.  A 
structured system of interconnected analysts offers the law enforcement community the 
greatest leverage.  Cooperative arrangements particularly empower smaller departments 
or other agencies that may not be “able to staff full-time criminal intelligence units.”186  
Regional networks, like the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) system, the 
Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS), or the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) 
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already have the infrastructure in place for intelligence sharing.  These networks can 
easily facilitate terrorism information and analytical collaboration as well.187  
Furthermore, the current Joint Terrorism Task Forces and the emergent state and regional 
fusion centers will pool analytical assets (and enjoy a healthy investment of federal 
analytical capability) specifically aimed at terrorism. 
Those organizations with the budget and manpower to establish analytical offices 
still need to network vertically and horizontally.  Analysts from various localities and 
regions evaluate patterns and trends in their jurisdictions, and share the intelligence with 
other jurisdictions and echelons in the network, as depicted in Figure 11.  Seemingly 
isolated events in one locality may in fact represent a   pattern across a wider geographic 
area.   
 
 
Figure 11 Layered Analytical Network Structure 
 
Suspected surveillance may become part of a larger picture when assessed 
alongside similar reports of train station surveillance in Montgomery, Alabama and 
Savannah, Georgia.  (See Figure 12.)  The regional analyst can alert the various localities 
in his area of responsibility, inform them about this pattern, and discharge them to look 
for additional surveillance in their respective jurisdictions.  With this new lead to follow, 
police in Charleston, Tallahassee and Mobile may soon discover rail surveillance in their 
cities and report it to the Atlanta regional office.   
                                                 




Figure 12 Regional Analytical Cooperation 
 
Analysts in the various jurisdictions can horizontally share information, compare 
assessments, and cross-levy collection requirements.  Police in Mobile can have their 
analyst query his counterpart in Savannah about the type of vehicle the surveillants used 
in their area, or the number of people seen surveilling the train station at a given time.  
The key is to keep the communication and information flowing to facilitate a broad 
analytical enterprise.188  Al-Qa’eda has demonstrated its intent and ability to strike 
multiple, geographically separated targets, nearly simultaneously.  If the terrorists are 
coordinating attacks over wide areas, the law enforcement organizations must also.  
Regional cross-fertilization compounds the value of terrorism intelligence analysis. 
L.  HARNESSING ANALYSIS FOR THE FUTURE 
Law enforcement agencies today recognize the need to gather intelligence if they 
hope to interdict terrorist operations in the United States.  The so-called intelligence 
failure of 11 September 2001, however, revealed that massive quantities of information 
were insufficient to thwart a terrorist attack; inadequate analysis proved to be the 
Achilles’ heel for the national Intelligence Community—a lesson the law enforcement 
                                                 
188 One must distinguish this from simple information sharing, which can take the form of broad 
“shotgun” dissemination of raw field data without necessarily applying analysis.  Networked analysis 
implies a sharing of information and a cooperative team approach to analyzing that information.  
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community should take to heart.  Analysis lends significance to collected information, 
thereby informing intelligence consumers who use it to craft policy, select defensive 
countermeasures, plan investigations and operations, or collect further intelligence.  The 
analyst provides the consumers with a picture of the aggressors and the threat—both a 
description of the present circumstances and a forecast of possible future events.  This 
forecasting is the lynchpin of terrorism analysis: it aims to interdict terrorist attacks and 
save lives.  Therefore, analyst accuracy is crucial.  Certain mental biases can encroach on 
that accuracy, however.  An analyst must be cognizant of the biases and work to reduce 
their effect on his analytical judgments.   
Furthermore, an analyst must wrestle massive amounts of data, risking 
information overload that may overwhelm his analytical abilities.  A few automated 
analytic tools are available to collate mountains of data and identify potential links 
between data elements (including multiple foreign name variants used by individual 
terrorist suspects).  Automated tools, though, are just that—tools.  The machines still 
require a skilled human analyst to feed them and interpret their outputs. 
A strong terrorism analytical capability does not reside in a single, isolate police 
intelligence unit.  A truly effective program must be structured across the law 
enforcement community, tying together analysts from multiple jurisdictions and 
echelons, from the local, through the regional, and up to the national level.  An integrated 
analytical network189 enables information sharing, cross-jurisdictional information 
queries, and, most importantly, the recognition of terrorist behavior patterns dispersed 
across a broad geographical spread—patterns not observable from isolated local 
jurisdictions.  The terrorists are dispersed but networked.  The law enforcement 
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V.  COVERING ASSETS: INTELLIGENTLY FOCUSED 
DEFENSIVE ACTIONS 
Intelligence collection and analysis for its own sake serves little purpose.  To have 
value, it must inform the planners and decision-makers who select courses of action to 
mitigate terrorist threats.  Terrorist threat intelligence simply forms the baseline for 
further action. 
Proper antiterrorism security planning requires good threat intelligence.  Security 
planners must know the terrorists’ capabilities, tactics and intentions in order to evaluate 
asset vulnerabilities in the proper context.  From there, they can tailor defensive measures 
accordingly.  An antiterrorism plan built in an intelligence void, however, risks protecting 
the wrong assets, or hardening the wrong resources improperly or incompletely.  Threat 
intelligence frames a coherent risk assessment, which in turn helps planners prioritize 
their defensive expenditures and select rational countermeasures.   
“The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for establishing the 
risk management framework necessary to coordinate” federal efforts “to identify and 
prioritize the United States’ critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR)” that 
require protection from terrorists.190  DHS has aggregated nearly 80,000 assets in a single 
comprehensive list, the National Asset Database (NADB), but currently lacks “the data 
and the analytical tools to provide a comprehensive risk assessment of the country’s 
critical infrastructure and key resources.”191   
Asset prioritization and protection responsibilities traditionally defaulted to local 
jurisdictions and the private sector, but the current push for a national program blurs the 
distinctions between federal, state and local interests.  Nearly 50,000 items in the NADB 
are not federal assets, but submissions from the states and territories.192  The criteria for 
nomination varies from state to state, fostering significant disparities in what states 
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consider “critical.”193  The federal government now must reconcile the asset list with a 
standardized risk assessment process, essentially assuming a planning responsibility 
previously exercised at lower echelons.  While a seemingly overwhelming task, this new 
approach offers some advantages.  Islamist terrorists, as noted in the Methodology and 
Analysis chapters, do not confine their operations to a single jurisdiction.  A multi-
layered analytical construct stands better suited to recognize and evaluate geographically 
dispersed activity, and can assist national antiterrorism planners apply uniform risk 
assessment tools, resource prioritization schemes and asset protection measures across 
the country.  Ideally under such a nation-wide regimen, a terrorist cell targeting a 
shopping mall in Seattle will fare no better by switching its focus to one in Memphis, and 
a cell won’t find it easier to attack a nuclear power plant in San Diego than a bus stop in 
Chicago.   
The federal government, states, territories and local jurisdictions all must adopt a 
set of standards for evaluating assets as potential terrorist targets.  Armed with accurate 
threat intelligence, each echelon can make rational, though somewhat subjective, risk 
assessments.  DHS has promulgated an tool called the Criticality Assessment Matrix, but 
a full risk analysis requires additional inputs.  This chapter proposes one comprehensive 
methodology, the Multi-Matrix Method, that combines intelligence inputs with the 
Criticality Assessment Matrix.  Planners at any level, from local to federal, may find the 
Multi-Matrix Method useful for assessing risks to assets and prioritizing risk mitigation 
efforts. 
A.  THREAT-BASED ASSESSMENTS AND PLANNING 
It might appear redundant to suggest that one must ascertain the specific nature 
and magnitude of the terrorist threat before evaluating a target’s potential vulnerabilities 
or developing security countermeasures.  However, people overlook this basic concept so 
often it warrants emphasis.  Time and again owners and users responsible for securing a 
resource (or protecting personnel) implement procedures without defining what 
specifically those actions should accomplish.  Usually they resort to familiar measures 
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“Homeland Security Asset Report Inflames Critics,” All Things Considered (12 July 2006), 
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that may have been effective against another threat encountered once in the past, but do 
not carefully consider the current threat.  These measures are sometimes called “knee-
jerk” reactions. 
Analysts assume the chief role in combing through available intelligence, taken in 
historical context, to approximate qualitatively what threat a terrorist group likely poses.  
This qualitative analysis should consider the group’s resources, such as money, 
personnel, weapons and materiel, to assess its capabilities.  The analysis must take into 
account the group’s intentions, based on the group’s publicly stated targeting goals, as 
well as those gleaned from informants and a careful assessment of the group’s historical 
activities.  This historical piece is critical, as it places any potential threats into proper 
context.  A group that for years has only attacked deserted ATM booths with pipe bombs 
is unlikely to escalate suddenly to sarin gas attacks against populated areas, even if the 
new terrorist leader issues a manifesto publicizing such a threat.194   
A proper security plan hinges on a good risk assessment, which takes into account 
the likelihood of a given attack, and the potential severity of the damage a successful 
attack may inflict.195  A proper understanding of hostile threats and a resource’s 
vulnerabilities informs the risk assessment.   
The threat evaluation begins the entire process, and it must precede the 
vulnerability assessment.  One can only ascertain an asset’s vulnerability in light of a 
given threat.  An ordinary automobile will protect its passengers from knife-wielding 
thugs; the passengers can be said to be relatively invulnerable.  If one of the thugs 
possesses a gun, however, the same automobile affords little protection; the passengers 
are assessed to be quite vulnerable.  Nothing is completely invulnerable.  Assets are only  
 
 
                                                 
194 One should not discount the possibility that the threat may evolve to adopt new methods, but such 
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Korean Connection (New York, NY: Crane Russack [Taylor & Francis New York, Inc.], 1990), p. 83. 
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82 
vulnerable or secure relative to a specific number of threats.  Pinpointing the threat 
proves necessary before one can adequately evaluate a resource’s security strengths and 
weaknesses. 
1.  Threats, Vulnerabilities and Countermeasures  
The assessment process requires a thorough understanding of the danger the 
adversary poses: what he wants to do (how he can attack), what he can do (his 
capabilities), and what he intends to do (his ultimate plans), and the three may not be 
congruent.  For example, a terrorist cell might wish to detonate a nuclear warhead in 
Washington, DC, but does not possess such a device.  It may have a biological weapon, 
with a highly virulent contagion, that it can deploy in a large city.  The group may intend, 
however, simply to detonate a massive truck bomb, laden with conventional explosives, 
because one of its supporting states has an embassy in Washington and has expressed 
concern about the collateral damage a bio-weapon would pose to its own diplomatic 
personnel. 
Knowing a terrorist group’s capabilities and intentions aids security specialists 
assess potential targets in context.  First, it narrows the likely target pool, which in turn 
helps the specialists and owner-users harden the appropriate resources.  Any police 
officer will agree that if several neighborhood jewelry stories have been heisted by a ring 
of diamond thieves, it stands to reason the police should focus the bulk of their defensive 
efforts on jewelry stores, rather than expend too much effort bolstering security measures 
for the neighborhood electronics stores, furriers or antique shops.  “Overestimating the 
threat potential means wasting dollars, personnel, time, and effort.”196  In this crime 
example, treating the threat against other businesses as equal to that faced by jewelry 
stores would be an overestimation of the threat to the other establishments.  The same 
reasoning applies to antiterrorism efforts.  Unfortunately, many people fail to appreciate 
the necessary link between the threat’s qualitative character and the potential targets.  
One Cold War veteran presumed the nearby nuclear submarine base would be one of al-
Qa’eda’s top targets.197  The base probably topped the Soviet Union’s target list during 
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Tactics, Procedures, and Techniques, 2nd Ed. (Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press LLC, 2002), p. 25. 
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the Cold War since nuclear counterstrike forces were a top priority for them, but 
realistically it was too far from a significant population center and too heavily fortified to 
make al-Qa’eda’s list.  The terrorist threat al-Qa’eda poses today differs significantly 
from the strategic nuclear threat the Soviet Union presented twenty years ago. 
The threat study helps planners prioritize targets needing their attention, and also 
informs them about likely attacks against which they must protect, giving them a baseline 
for evaluating each target’s vulnerabilities.  “Target or threat analysis includes not only 
the likelihood of becoming a target, but also whether or not offered defenses are 
sufficient to discourage attacks”198 or limit the damage they may inflict.  This step is 
iterative, in that one must analyze the asset’s current security measures in light of the 
threat; once the planners select additional measures to address any security weaknesses, 
they must re-evaluate those measures to determine if they will, in fact, reduce the 
vulnerabilities and mitigate the threat.  Carefully re-examining the nature of the threat 
and comparing it to proposed antiterrorism countermeasures will normally disclose 
whether the security actions can effectively address the threat.  Often decision makers 
overlook this comparative “check step” when selecting defensive measures.199   
When denied the luxury to take the time to evaluate the threat, brainstorm 
appropriate countermeasures, and consider their effectiveness against that threat, security 
planners often fall prey to the unconscious misconception that inconvenience equals 
security.  They may also implement familiar measures that might be suitable for one kind 
of threat (such as ordinary crime), but notably inappropriate for the threat in question 
(terrorism).  Installing metal detectors and X-ray machines at a building’s entrance might 
prevent a person from smuggling a weapon into the facility, but if the predominant 
terrorist MO is to park a truck bomb in front of the building, the security measures will 
prove inadequate.  
This example underscores how important it is to base antiterrorism and security 
processes on a thorough threat analysis.  Terrorists do not act randomly, nor do they act 
capriciously or spontaneously.  Rather, they carefully select targets, plan their attacks, 
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and generally continue to use weapons and methods that have served their purposes well 
in the past.  Most generic security procedures have been designed to protect against 
common criminal threats, which often consist of spontaneous criminal acts against targets 
of opportunity.  Muggers prey on random victims in dark alleys and streets.  Terrorists do 
not; they orchestrate carefully planned operations against select victims, which means 
common anti-crime measures may not thwart their designs.200 
2.  Ulterior Motives 
A poor understanding of the threat can foster poor security choices in another 
way.  People sometimes implement improper defensive countermeasures based on an 
alternative agenda, one not related to security or antiterrorism.  They may capitalize on a 
security issue to introduce potential security solutions that satisfy the non-security 
agenda.201  A good threat assessment will enable security planners to evaluate the 
potential solutions’ efficacy, and to discard any that do not appropriately mitigate the 
threat. 
3.  Collateral Consequences 
An antiterrorism plan does not simply end with selecting good security 
countermeasures.  The measures may introduce side effects or unintended, collateral 
consequences.  These unintended consequences can take two forms: they may have 
spillover effects not directly related to security,202 or they may introduce new security 
vulnerabilities to the resource in question or other resources.203  An armored car may be 
the ideal solution to protect a motorist from carjackers carrying firearms.  Armored cars 
naturally weigh more than ordinary cars, necessitating a larger engine which burns more 
gasoline.  An unintended spillover effect, then, is the increased fuel consumption and 
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concomitant expense.  Being heavier, an armored car will have more momentum, thus 
being be more difficult to handle in tight turns and sudden stops; this poses an additional 
safety (distinct from security) hazard for the driver.  Finally, if the driver is commuting in 
a hostile environment where terrorists target VIPs in armored vehicles, the driver’s new 
car may raise his profile.  The terrorists may mistake him for a dignitary and attack him 
with a rocket-propelled grenade, against which his armor is ineffective.  Thus, while his 
armored car protects the motorist from the original threat—the carjackers—it exposes 
him to a new threat, the heavily armed terrorists.   
A collateral consequence being unintended does not mean it should be 
unexpected.  Good planners must anticipate the potential side effects of any course of 
action.  Consequences must balance with the intended gains; a new security threat that 
dwarfs the original one should discount a countermeasure’s utility.  Even if the measure 
effectively addresses the original threat, it could open up avenues for other threats, 
drawing the planners into an iterative evaluation process where they must balance 
multiple liabilities to select the optimal all-around solution. 
Sometimes a poor countermeasure choice compounds the issue by creating 
unintended weaknesses while failing to address the original threat in the first place.  This 
often stems from improperly grasping the threat.  Security specialist Bruce Schneier 
notes, “If you mischaracterize your attackers, you’re likely to misallocate your defenses.  
You’re likely to worry about nonexistent threats and ignore real ones.  Doing so isn’t 
necessarily a disaster, but it is certainly more likely to result in one.”204 
Consider the following example of off-base restrictions.  The U.S. military 
reaction to September 11th was fairly universal.  Overseas commanders, fearing other 
strikes, locked down their personnel on the installations.  Gradually, intelligence and 
counterintelligence personnel got a handle on the al-Qa’eda threats in their respective 
localities, and commanders began letting their troops leave the bases to patronize local 
national businesses, but within certain restrictions.  The commanders at one overseas air 
base205 initially prohibited their troops from visiting bars or nightclubs.  Their rationale 
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stemmed from two lines of analysis.  The first was legitimate: Al-Qa’eda preferred 
attacking large clusters of Americans to maximize carnage.  American troops did not 
cluster in shops or restaurants in nearly the numbers or density as they did in bars, so 
shopping and dining establishments were less attractive targets.  Keeping troops out of 
the bars and nightclubs kept them from congregating in numbers that might entice a 
terrorist attack.   
The second line of logic, however, had no grounding in threat analysis:  Some 
people reasoned that inebriated troops were less vigilant and had slower reflexes than 
sober ones (true), so they would be less likely to notice and recognize an attack in 
progress, and they would be less capable of reacting to it because of their intoxication 
(again, true).  Thus, they concluded groups of drunken GIs made attractive terrorist 
targets, and suggested the terrorists actually took this into account during their target 
assessment.  Intelligence uncovered no indication that Islamist transnational terrorists (al-
Qa’eda included) considered people’s level of intoxication as a planning factor.  While 
the argument is a sound one as far a vulnerability, no intelligence data suggested terrorist 
operatives would choose a group of drunken Airmen over a group of sober ones, simply 
by virtue of their relative degrees of inebriation.  Rather, the operatives were more likely 
to take into account raw numbers of patrons, facility structural vulnerability, and ease 
access for explosive emplacement, without regard to the patrons’ alcoholic indulgence. 
206 
Prohibiting Airmen from patronizing local bars equated to fewer drunken brawls 
off-base.  Certainly a bar restriction would be a great mechanism to reduce the number of 
alcohol-related assaults if that were the primary threat for which the security measure was 
intended.  Unfortunately, the commanders implemented the alcohol restriction as 
antiterrorism measures to protect the Americans from the transnational Islamist terrorist 
threat.  The measures’ appeal stemmed not from sound security analysis, but from an 
alternative agenda. 
The early curfew incident had an even darker side.  It did not address the actual 
threat, though it did create a potentially unsafe situation for the troops by presenting a 
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more alluring target for terrorists.  The weekend curfew for active duty military 
personnel, prior to 9/11, was as late as 2 a.m.  This meant all personnel had to be back 
inside the base confines by curfew or, for those renting off-base apartments, inside their 
homes.  Military police patrolled downtown looking for any GIs who might be out past 
curfew, and they would apprehend any they found.   
The new, curtailed curfew was set at 8 p.m.  On the surface, this would appear 
reasonable:  keep people off the streets as much as possible to limit their exposure to the 
threat and reduce the risk.  Early curfews can protect people from street crimes—
muggings, assaults or rapes—in areas where violent criminals tend to operate at late 
hours.  But this reasoning did not take into account the nature of the terrorist threat.  (In 
fact, a subsequent analysis of Islamist terrorist attack trends from 1998 to 2005 disclosed 
no attacks between the hours of 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.207)  Furthermore, the curfew initiative 
created unintended consequences.  Setting an early curfew—especially a very early 
curfew—created a logjam at the base’s main gate, baiting terrorists with a veritable salt 
lick. 
Terrorists do not operate like muggers; they do not wait around until 9 p.m. to 
come outside, so rushing everyone onto the base early in the evening “before the 
terrorists come out” isn’t an effective strategy.  Terrorist organizations like al-Qa’eda—
whom the U.S. believed to be the pre-eminent threat at the time—spend months gathering 
information about their prospective targets, paying particular attention to the times and 
locations where larger groups of people cluster together (shift changes, communal dining 
periods, etc.) in exposed or accessible locations.  A convenience store directly across the 
street from the main gate provided an excellent place for terrorist operatives to sit and 
observe pedestrian traffic through the gate.  Any observer could note that just before 
curfew, a swell of people gathered outside the pedestrian gate, each awaiting his turn to 
pass through the identification checkpoint.  For a 2 a.m. curfew, there will be an 
appreciable bottleneck of people whose life’s mission is to stay out drinking as late as 
possible.  If the curfew is scaled back to 11 p.m., those hard core, bar-hopping “curfew 
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pushers” will gather at the gate at 11 p.m., while the folks who would normally filter 
through between 11 and midnight, after some mild socializing, would also cluster up at 
the gate to make the 11 o’clock deadline.  Ratchet the curfew back to 8 o’clock, and you 
have the first two groups bottlenecked at the gate, joined by the casual dinnertime crowd 
and evening shoppers—folks who would usually filter through the gate between 8 and 11 
o’clock.  The effect is easy to see: a tremendous backlog of people congregating outside 
the gate and exposed on the unsecured street, each waiting for a turn through the 
checkpoint.  Earlier curfews create greater congestion, which to a terrorist translates to 
opportunities for bigger, more sensational mass casualty events.  (How easy it would 
have been to drive an explosive-laden mini-bus right up to the crowd!)  As this case 
illustrates, if one doesn’t properly assess the threat, seemingly intuitive security measures 
can actually become counterproductive. 
4.  At What Cost? 
Sound antiterrorism measures may address the threat, but they incur costs, both 
monetary and intangible.  The planners must weight the costs against the security gains, 
as they represent trade-offs.  These differ from collateral consequences, in that trade-offs 
constitute a central part of the equation and are not simply side-effects.  One would not 
consider the purchase price of a large ice cream sundae an unintended consequence; a 
buyer expects to surrender a set amount of his money in order to enjoy a decadent 
dessert.  Getting fat, on the other hand, may rightly be considered an unintended 
consequence.  Sometimes the collateral side-effects are not worth the benefit gained; the 
joy of eating a sundae may not be worth the extra calories.  Nevertheless, even absent the 
side-effects, the costs at some point will outstrip the gains, such as when the sundae price 
is too high, or the would-be buyer is too full from supper to enjoy a large dessert.  The 
same holds true for security countermeasures, specifically when the choices are 
prohibitively expensive or simply exceed what would reasonably mitigate the risk.  
The threat and vulnerabilities partly determine the risk to a given asset or 
resource, including people.  Risk is also a function of the likelihood something damaging 
(a terrorist attack) might occur, and the degree of potential damage the resource could 
sustain.208  Property damage may be easily quantified in fiscal terms, as well as 
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secondary effects like lost income that the resource would otherwise earn were it not for 
the attack.  Insurance compensation constitutes yet another economic loss.  Potential 
human casualties may be calculated in simple numbers, but emotional damages become 
harder to quantify.  Sometimes they manifest themselves insidiously in reduced employee 
efficiency or decreased customer confidence—all tied to future economic losses.  
Assessing risk in dollar figures makes the decision process straightforward.  Weighing 
security measures’ social or economic costs against human lives becomes tricky.  How 
much money should one reasonably spend to protect a hundred lives?  Ten lives?  Saving 
lives is worth how much inconvenience? 
Assessing the utility of having an armored car illustrates the cost-benefit calculus. 
An armored car will protect someone from a carjacking—keeping his car from being 
stolen at gunpoint, and keeping him alive in the chance a given carjacker tries to kill him.  
Assume the armored car costs $100,000, while a regular car costs 25,000 dollars.  
Assuming a motorist buys a new car every ten years, he spends either $100,000 on an 
armored car or $25,000 for a regular car every ten years.  At what point would the 
expense of buying an armored car seem prudent?  The point of equal utility would be 
when the cost of losing regular cars equals the cost of owning an armored car, or 100,000 
dollars.  That is, a car owner would have to get carjacked four times every ten years for 
the armored car to constitute a feasible expense (considering only the monetary loss, not 
the psychological and emotional trauma that come from repeated victimization).  
Therefore, if carjackings occur with such frequency that a motorist can statistically 
expect to get carjacked once every 2½ years (which translates roughly to once every 912 
days), then getting an armored car warrants the expense.  In a city of one million people, 
a motorist faces this risk when the city suffers 1096 carjackings each day. 
Now consider a city of one million inhabitants, in which one person each day gets 
carjacked.  Furthermore, only one motorist gets killed out of every one hundred 
carjackings.  Thus, the chance of any one person being carjacked on a given day is one in 
a million, or 0.000001.  A motorist can statistically expect to have his car stolen in a 
carjacking once every one million days, or roughly once every 2,700 years.  The odds of 
getting killed are even smaller at one in one hundred million, or 10-8, giving the motorist 
a statistical expectation of being murdered in a carjacking once in 270,000 years.  Since 
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most motorists don’t expect to live 2,700 years, let alone 270,000 years, the armored car 
doesn’t offer much utility statistically speaking.  But the motorist may still wish to buy an 
armored car to avoid dying in a carjacking; the expense doesn’t make much sense from a 
fiscal perspective when considering potential theft, but a risk-averse car owner may still 
prefer not to leave his life to chance.209 
Risk ultimately represents the key decisive element in assessing the costs or trade-
offs—in determining “Are they worth it?” 
B.  PLANNING FOR SECURITY: A PROPOSED METHODOLOGY   
An arithmetic decision matrix provides planners with a simple mechanism to sort 
and rank-order multiple competing items.  In an antiterrorism context, the items are 
generally assets that planners wish to defend from potential attack, and the items compete 
for limited protection resources.  Planners may evaluate each component of a 
comprehensive risk assessment using a decision matrix, from the likelihood terrorists will 
strike a given target, to the potential harm such an attack may inflict.  These components 
may be further decomposed into sub-matrices to evaluate information inputs in finer 
detail and to improve the risk assessment’s overall objectivity.  One potentially useful 
technique, based on this concept of layered decision matrices, is the Multi-Matrix 
Method.  This methodology capitalizes on an intelligence-based threat assessment and 
vulnerability assessment to evaluate the relative risk to multiple potential targets, and to 
do so as objectively as possible. 
1.  Prioritizing Potential Targets  
A risk assessment helps antiterrorism planners balance the costs of security 
against the potential costs of an attack.  The risk assessment guides the planners to 
prioritize their efforts and expenditures.  A risk assessment scope varies in relation to a 
planner’s breadth of responsibility.  Private resource owners have a smaller target field; 
public safety officials have much broader array of assets to protect, usually defined by a 
geographic jurisdiction or area of responsibility.  As the scope of responsibility widens, 
the number of potential targets grows, thereby increasing the need for prioritization in 
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antiterrorism planning.  One cannot protect every asset equally, despite the ideal goal of 
applying horizontal protection to society as a whole; resources are finite and the potential 
targets are virtually unlimited.   
While it’s impossible to protect every asset terrorists could possibly target, not 
every asset will realistically fall under the terrorists’ consideration.  The terrorists have 
limited resources and manpower, too, so they will concentrate on a select pool of assets 
to evaluate for potential targeting.  Therefore, one would ideally concentrate defenses on 
those potential targets the terrorists find most attractive—ideally, the very same target list 
the terrorists have compiled.  Short of such perfect information, security planners must 
make their best guess of what such a list might look like, using conceptually driven threat 
analysis to build a model of the terrorist targeting strategy.  Planners can then follow the 
targeting strategy model to evaluate assets from the terrorists’ perspective, a technique 
called “Red Teaming.”  The planners then build a prioritized target list, based on what 
choices they would make if they themselves were the terrorists.210 
The terrorist target list alone does not dictate defensive priorities.  It contributes to 
the overall risk assessment, which considers what the terrorists might do along with what 
losses the resources owners wish to mitigate.  The Red Team’s list might accurately 
assess landfills to be at the top of an environmentalist group’s attack list, and the 
preferred time to attack is late at night.  The municipal security planners might consider 
the electric power plant to be more important to the county’s welfare and functioning, 
though the plant may be low on the terrorists’ hit list.  The risk assessment suggests an 
attack at the power plant would be devastating, while a midnight bombing at the dump 
might would be a mere nuisance.  Therefore, it behooves the city to put more effort into 
shoring up the power plant’s security, as opposed to defending the terrorists’ prime 
target, the landfill.  Precisely how much effort will depend on where the power plant 
stands on the terrorists’ priority list, and how much risk the city is willing to accept. 
The following multi-matrix methodology pulls together the threat and target 
vulnerabilities into a coherent risk assessment tool that ultimately suggests priorities for 
antiterrorism planners. 
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Figure 13 depicts a Risk Assessment Matrix.211  The risk to a target is based on 
the likelihood, or probability, an attack may occur (on a scale from unlikely to likely), and 
the expected loss or damage a successful attack may inflict, also called the severity of an 
attack (ranging between minor to critical).  The matrix generates a risk score, on a scale 
of 1 to 5, for an asset (potential target) under consideration, based on the estimated 
probability and severity of such an attack on that asset. 
 
 
Figure 13 Risk Assessment Matrix 
 
One uses a series of subordinate matrices to calculate the severity and probability 
of an attack against a specific target.  The Risk Assessment Matrix uses qualitative inputs 
for an attack’s severity (negligible, minor, serious and critical) and probability (unlikely, 
may occur and probable).  The subordinate Severity and Probability Matrices generate 
raw numbers and then translate them to qualitative ratings for the Risk Assessment 
Matrix. 
2.  Severity Matrix 
The Homeland Security Criticality Assessment Matrix (HLS-CAM) scores the 
“criticality” of a successful attack based on a number of criteria, each of which is 
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examined in its own sub-matrix.212  (For the purpose of feeding the Risk Assessment 
Matrix, the term severity will substitute for criticality, and the HLS-CAM hence will be 
renamed the Severity Matrix.)  The sub-matrices quantify a worst-case attack’s potential 
human casualties (deaths and injuries); the economic loss; any effects on critical 
infrastructure; an attack’s symbolic effect; and the environmental impact.  A planner uses 
the sub-matrices (Figure 14) to score these criteria for each potential target, which he 
then incorporates into the Severity Matrix. 
 
 
Figure 14 Severity Sub-Matrices 
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Figure 15 depicts the Severity Matrix tool with sample scores.  All assets under 
consideration fall in the first column, one target per row.  The planner puts the sub-matrix 
(criterion) scores for each target in the same row, under the corresponding criterion 
column (columns 2 through 6).  The scores in a given row are added together to form a 
total for each target, which becomes the target’s severity score in column 7.  In the event 
two or more assets tie in severity score (like Asset 3 and Asset 4 in Figure 15), their 
relative death/injury values in column 2 break the tie to determine their rank order 
(ranking) in column 8.213  The ranking prioritizes the potential destruction each asset 
contributes to the overall assessment.  The Risk Assessment Matrix uses qualitative 
labels for the severity, which translate directly from the numerical severity score. 
 
 
Figure 15 Severity Matrix (HLS-CAM) 
 
3.  Probability Matrix 
A Probability Matrix scores the relative likelihood or probability of attack against 
a field of assets (Figure 16).  The Probability Matrix functions much like the Severity 
Matrix, where assets are compared based on their scores in underlying criteria.  Each 
probability criterion—terrorist targeting method of operations, terrorist capabilities and                                                  
213 All other things being equal, the human casualty toll trumps a tie.  If two or more assets remain 
tied after factoring in the death/injury scores, they should remain tied, as further refinement is unnecessary.   
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target vulnerability—gets its score from its own respective sub-matrix.  Figure 17 
illustrates the probability sub-matrices.  Once again, each target’s final probability score 
in column 5 must be converted to a qualitative risk assessment probability in column 6 
that will feed the Risk Assessment Matrix. 
 
 





Figure 17 Probability Sub-Matrices 
 
The likelihood a target will be attacked stems partly from the terrorists’ motive 
and intent, which a thorough threat assessment should ascertain and feed into the Red 
Team’s targeting strategy model.  The planners (or Red Team) consider how a terrorist 
group might attack a given asset and compare that method to the terrorists’ known or 
suspected capabilities, as well as the group’s target preferences.  In some cases, a terrorist 
organization has historically demonstrated a penchant for striking certain targets; in other 
instances, they have expressed a desire to do so—perhaps issued threats to that effect—
but have yet to pull off an attack against such a target.  A terrorist group may not have 
succeeded in attacking a certain target type, but if they’ve tried in the past, however 
unsuccessful they may have been, they clearly have shown their intent.  (Ahmed 
Rezzam’s attempt to collapse the World Trade Center in 1993 was unsuccessful, but the 
intent was clear.  Al-Qa’eda’s successful re-attack in 2001 may have been, in part, an 
effort to complete unfinished business and to demonstrate Islamist resolve to the United 
States.)   
The terrorists also consider their own capabilities and an asset’s vulnerability in 
selecting targets.  Terrorists will strike a target that offers reasonable hope of success.  
These two planning factors round out the inputs to the Probability Matrix. 
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4.  Cross-Feeding the Matrices 
Figure 18 illustrates the entire multi-step risk assessment process.  The threat 
assessment feeds the vulnerability assessment, both of which inform the probability sub-
matrices.  Meanwhile, threat information concerning the terrorist MO and capabilities 
allows planners to gauge the potential severity of an attack against each resource, given 
its current vulnerabilities.  The planners generate results from the respective sub-matrices 
to populate the Severity Matrix and the Probability Matrix, which in turn provide inputs 
to the final Risk Assessment Matrix.  The Risk Assessment Matrix identifies the assets 
that need priority attention.  The planners can then address the extant vulnerabilities of 




Figure 18 Risk Assessment Process 
 
The Multi-Matrix Method’s key strength is that it limits the subjectivity in the 
decision-making.  Granted, planners cannot entirely eliminate subjectivity, particularly in 
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the early assessment phases, but the multi-matrix method reduces its influence.  The tool 
arithmetically generates risk measures for each asset.  The results sometimes prove 
counterintuitive: the matrix may identify a high-priority asset that planners, based on a 
simple gut check, had previously considered low-risk.  Appendix Y offers an illustrative 
example of how the Multi-Matrix Method operates. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Resource protection and security planning, once the purview of local jurisdictions, 
has become a national endeavor, with the Department of Homeland Security assuming 
new responsibilities at the federal level.  Today, planning and prioritization occur at all 
echelons, from the local jurisdiction to the federal level.  Building uniform planning and 
prioritization criteria and methods that can be used across the country and at all levels 
becomes even more important to provide an even level of asset protection and resource 
allocation. 
Antiterrorism planning begins with a good intelligence evaluation of potential 
threats.  Once a broad assessment has identified likely threats and targets (assets), 
security planners must identify the vulnerabilities of those assets and evaluate the 
potential risks they face, thereupon selecting the appropriate defensive countermeasures.  
(Planners must also weigh unintended side-effects that a given security measure may 
induce, lest they negate the measure’s value.)   
Security planners have innumerable potential targets to consider, and limited 
resources with which to defend them.  A solid risk assessment prioritizes defensive 
planning, from which point security specialists figure out how to protect or defend the 
specific assets.  Proper security planning boils down to a cost-benefit analysis of each 
security countermeasure under consideration.  Arithmetic decision matrices take much of 
the guesswork out of security planning.  A multi-layered technique, called the Multi-
Matrix Method, feeds intelligence-based threat and vulnerability assessments into 
decision matrices to compare the risks facing multiple assets.   
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
Transnational Islamist terrorism no longer remains the relatively exclusive 
concern of national intelligence agencies, the military or the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.  Post-9/11, the American public entrusts every law enforcement 
organization, from federal to local, to protect the people in its respective jurisdiction.  
The department or office at each echelon has functions to perform, and all must integrate 
their efforts to be effective.  
Law enforcement officers face a pervasive, religiously motivated threat, that 
arguably evolved into its modern form on the battlefields of Afghanistan.  The campaign 
against the 1979 Soviet invasion became a political touchstone for the Muslim world, 
presenting the Muslim community, the umma, with an ideal Islamic archetype in the 
microcosm of a unified jihad.  Foreign volunteers of disparate nationalities joined in one 
common Islamic cause and forged a cohesive tribal loyalty, or asabiya, on the 
battlefield.214  This laid the foundations of an international network of mujahed brethren, 
who returned to their respective home countries imbued with a spirit of jihad and eager to 
supplant their oppressive governments with more Islamic regimes.  Unfortunately for 
them, the jihadis lapsed into localism and factionalism, tearing apart the once-unified 
brotherhood.  The movement had lost its jihadi asabiya to parochial, nationalist 
interests.215  Osama bin Laden endeavored to reinvigorate the jihad in the 1990s by 
redirecting the jihadis’ focus from their domestic regimes—the near enemy—to a more 
international campaign against the West.216  He succeeded in achieving a measure of 
unified action through his al-Qa’eda network, but failed to reconcile divergent interests 
and eliminate in-fighting.217  Post-9/11, al-Qa’eda’s leaders appear to have adapted a 
geographically distributed network to a strategic framework that affords local jihadi 
affiliates a measure of operational leeway, while aligned with the broader goals of the 
global campaign.                                                    
214 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global (New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 86. 
215 Ibd., pp. 117-118. 
216 Ibid., pp. 117-118. 
217 For details on the fractures in the jihad, see Gerges, pp. 151-184. 
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The global jihad network may be distributed and in places decentralized, but law 
enforcement officers must resist the temptation to apply overly generalized 
characterizations to the global apparatus.  It has become fashionable to paint the entire 
global jihadi cooperative as a fully decentralized entity, simply by virtue of being a 
network.  Such “net think” potentially shackles and biases the analysis of the terrorist 
apparatus, blinding officials to the subtleties of a network’s structure that may be 
susceptible to manipulation.  Certain elements, such as al-Qa’eda’s High Command, still 
retain a hierarchical structure; al-Qa’eda continues to exert as much control as it can over 
worldwide operations through direct instruction, by means of training and resource 
control, or through ideologues who frame jihadi discourse and encourage compliance 
with al-Qa’eda’s strategic and tactical preferences.  Grand ideology guides the terrorists’ 
strategy, which in turn directs the operational tactics and methods.  The Internet bridges 
and blends the strategic and tactical levels of operation, and fosters communication in an 
environment of relative security. An unbiased analysis of the jihadi network requires 
officials to delve into terrorist rhetoric, strategy and operational communications, most of 
which can be gleaned from the Internet—if they know where to search.  Examining the 
substance of network internodal linkages—primarily communications content—analysts 
can flesh out any hierarchical command relationships.  From there, officials can tactically 
isolate key power players to hinder jihadi communications and their command and 
control mechanisms; they may interdict resource flows in order to hobble terrorist 
operations or to flush out previously unknown organizational redundancies and network 
members.   
Officials charged with antiterrorism planning should remain leery of network-on-
network solutions that paint the global jihad as a fully decentralized, nearly leaderless 
enterprise that must be counteracted with equally decentralized operations.  Eschewing 
vertical operational management risks sacrificing strategic insight and synchronization 
for tactical innovation, predicated on the erroneous presumption that hierarchical 
counteraction strategies are inherently viscous and unresponsive.  Centrally managed 
antiterrorism and counterterrorism strategies, particularly those concerning intelligence 
exploitation, may prove more effective at recognizing faults or weaknesses that law 
enforcement agencies can exploit in proactive operations. 
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Cleavages persist in the jihadi enterprise to this day.  They reveal both potential 
targets and allies in the fight against Islamist terrorists.  Some outlying associates in the 
network have looser loyalties to the global jihad, and law enforcement operations may 
pick them off, culling them from the larger network.  Law enforcement agencies may 
neutralize these weak nodes either through arrests or by co-opting them as cooperating 
assets.  Additionally, rivalries between factions or individuals within the network may 
represent leverage points that can be exploited; competitors in the jihadi enterprise may 
be pitted against each other, either as recruited informants or unwitting assets.   
Human intelligence is the key to collecting on the Islamist terrorist threat.  Human 
sources of information provide insight into the secretive world of the clandestine jihadi 
apparatus, offering clues that technical intelligence platforms are ill-suited to detect. 
Additionally, while they may lack the technical collection systems that national 
intelligence agencies possess, law enforcement agencies boast a long tradition of 
employing human informants and therefore have a strong baseline in sourcing. Ethnic 
and religious demographics make the process somewhat tricky, but proper cultural 
understanding will help law enforcement officers partner with suitable members of 
society to target their collections.  From imams to mukhtars, the Muslim community 
presents a number of knowledgeable members who can serve as signposts or active 
participants in the campaign to identify and eliminate jihadi operatives in their midst. 
Analysis is crucial.  Historical and recent intelligence failures can be traced to 
poor or non-existent analysis.  Police generally lack the resources or institutional 
background to field an effective and broad antiterrorism analytical capability.  However, 
a multi-layered approach seems to offer the best means of bringing local intelligence to 
higher echelons, and to capitalize on regional and national analytical organs to build a 
cooperative that can detect and challenge geographically dispersed patterns of terrorist 
activity.  A cooperative analysis network that integrates both vertical and horizontal 
relationships may prove the most effective.   
Finished, analyzed intelligence represents the currency of defensive planning and 
terrorism countermeasures.  Sound threat and vulnerability assessments, rooted in good 
intelligence, allow planners to identify likely terrorist targets, evaluate the risks the 
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targets face, and prioritize protective resources.  Efforts by the Department of Homeland 
Security to manage asset prioritization nation-wide revealed stark inconsistencies and 
subjectivity in state and local risk evaluations.  This highlights the need for a common 
risk assessment strategy.  The Multi-Matrix Method proposed in this thesis, if applied at 
all echelons, may increase risk assessment objectivity and help bring the country to a 
common standard. 
The global jihad is purposefully secretive and elusive, and the targets they have to 
choose from are countless.  Sound intelligence empowers law enforcement professionals 
to get ahead of terrorist targeting, to prevent future attacks and to weaken the Islamist 
terrorist network in America.  Armed with intelligence tools, law enforcement officers 
will be effectively policing toward a de-clawed jihad.     
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APPENDIX A.  AL-QA’EDA INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS218 
A. FOR TARGETING AN INDIVIDUAL PERSON219  
 
• Biographical information (name, age, marital status, whether he is armed) 
• Residential information (home address, entrances and exits, neighborhood 
characteristics, means to enter covertly, armed security on premises) 
• Type of employment 
• Commute times between home and work 
• Commuting routes between home and work 
• Information on his car 
• Names and addresses of his friends 
• Leisure activities or hobbies, known vacation spots 
• Information on stores he may frequent 
• Information on spouse’s employment 
• Information on the children’s school and whether target ever visits the 
school 
• Mistress or girlfriend, address and times he visits her 
• Information on his doctor 
 
B. FOR TARGETING A FACILITY OR ACTIVITY 
 
• Specific location 
• Exterior shape of the facility 
• Area or acreage of facility 
• Number of rooms and floors inside any buildings 
• Number of occupants 
• Telephone line information, including switchboard location 
• Information on other means of communication 
• Electric power access 
                                                 
218 Military Studies in the Jihad against the Tyrants [a.k.a. The al-Qa’eda Terrorist Training Manual 
or The Encyclopedia of Jihad], [attributed to Al-Qa’eda, ca. 1992 or 1993, translated by the Greater 
Manchester Constabulary, UK, ca. 2002], pp. UK/BM-72-73, 90-91. 
219 The manual is worded specifically for a target of male gender. 
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• Parking 
• Information on vehicles in the facility 
• Lighting (location, brightness, timing) 
• Security (guards, locations, types of weapons and ammunition on site, 
response protocols, fortifications and any tunnels) 
• Command structure with biographical information of high-ranking 
personnel 
• Names of units or organizations assigned to the facility 
• Leave or liberty policy 
• Shift schedules (sleeping and waking periods) 
• Physical layout and environment (urban, rural, dense or open space) 
• Neighborhood characteristics and socioeconomic environment 
• Any public parks in vicinity 
• Nearby government or police offices, including diplomatic establishments 
• Width and direction of travel for roadways in the vicinity 
• Traffic information (times of heavy congestion, traffic signal information, 




APPENDIX B.  EXAMPLE SOURCE OPERATIONS220 
 





























                                                 
220 Mariani lists numerous potential sources with resource-specific or target-specific access.  See Cliff 
Mariani, Terrorism Prevention and Response: The Definitive Law Enforcement Guide to Prepare for 
Terrorist Activity, 2nd Edition (New York, NY: Looseleaf Law Publications, Inc., 2004), pp. 128-132.  
221 Generally, a source repeatedly reporting on a specific individual suspect may expect to face a 
greater degree of risk than the occasional reporter.  In such a case, he should be treated as a confidential 
informant, rather than an open contact. 
222 Resource-Specific, in the context of employment, simply means that specific type of work or 
employment with the company provides a mechanism by which a terrorist operative may gain access to 
material or targets.  The resource in this context is the employment itself, or the position with the company. 
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Driver repeatedly volunteers to fill in on 
others’ shifts. 
 
Driver repeatedly works extra shifts 
 
Driver repeatedly changes or requests to 




Driver’s fare earnings are 
uncharacteristically low for hours 
worked. 
 
Driver calls in off-duty while out on the 






Driver may display jihadi paraphernalia 
in his taxi. 
 
 
Driver may be trying to get exposure to 
traffic patterns at different times of day in 
effort case traffic around a target (traffic 
representing potential attack victims or 
traffic representing a planning factor for 
access to and escape from the target, i.e. 





Driver may be using his job as taxi driver as 
cover to case targets, access and escape 
routes, and traffic patterns, as above.  
Excessive time off the clock suggests the 
driver may be driving without taking fares, 
leaving himself the initiative to drive where 
and when he wants; passengers (fares) force 
the driver to adhere to someone else’s 
agenda. 
 
Jihadi paraphernalia may indicate sympathy 





















Resource-Specific or   
Target-Specific;  















Prospective worker expresses interest in 
working on specific job sites connected to 
potential targets in critical infrastructure 
or key assets; job sites may be at or near 
the targets, to include sites giving clear 
view of a given target.  If a day laborer 
passes up a job offer because the job site 
doesn’t match his specific criteria, this is 
a bigger clue. 
 






Prospective laborer may be a scout, seeking 
access to surveil (observe over time) or 
reconnoitre (make a one-time observation to 






Prospective laborer may not have the 
requisite experience for the task and may be 
simply using the employment as a ruse to 




Worker may ask detailed questions about 
the target, with particular attention to 
vulnerabilities or means to gain future 
access. 
 
Worker may spend inordinate amount of 
time observing or studying the target, 
rather than focusing on the job.  May take 
notes or photographs. 
 
Worker attempts to gain employment 
with demolition crew without proper 
background or bona fides; worker on 
construction team may try to gain access 




Prospective laborer may be using the 
employment to collect pre-attack intelligence 




Prospective laborer may be attempting to 
gain access to demolition materials and 







































May point to production of chemical or 
biological weapons.  (Not exclusive to 
terrorist weapons production--may also be 











 Open Contact or  
Confidential Informant 
(Confidential Informant if 
risk is posed by routinely 
























Multiple male residents in a single 





Unusual living conditions observed 
during service calls, such as a lack of 
furnishings but the presence of medical 
supplies or chemistry equipment and 
industrial chemicals; potted plants or 
hydroponics; video or photography 
equipment, maps, diagrams, schematics 
and blueprints; multiple respirators or gas 
masks; multiple itineraries or schedules; 
or computer equipment.   
 
 
May indicate the presence of a clique or cell.  
(Multiple roommates should not be the sole 
indicator; however, secretive behavior 
suggests the group may have something 
illicit they wish to hide.) 
 
The apartment may appear to be more of an 
operational staging area or safehouse, rather 
than a long-term residence.  Presence of 
operational items may point to pre-
operational planning, weapons acquisition or 
even weapons development (including small-

































Observation of any patrons who might 
appear radicalized or Salafi.  May harass 
other customers for not being pious 
enough, or may praise them for shopping 
in a Halal store. 
 
 


























Information on other patrons, information on the store proprietors, direct observation of 









Observation of any patrons who might 
appear radicalized or Salafi.  May be 
harassed by radical Salfist customers for 
not being pious enough, or may be 
praised by them for shopping in a Halal 
store. 
 
Presence of any jihadi paraphernalia in 
the store, such as pro-jihadi posters, 
photos, shrines, posters or calendars 










Suggests a pro-jihad leaning on the part of 





                                                 
223 Gerald Posner, Why America Slept: The Failure to Prevent 9/11 (New York, NY: Random House, 
2003), p. 3; First Technologies, LLC., “Understanding Islamist Militant Terrorism and Prevention 























Neighborhood member information, neighborhood activities, signs of radical 









Emergence or arrival of vocal, radical 
elements; emergence of Salafist cliques; 
scheduled visits in the area by outspoken, 
radical speakers or imams; approaches by 
people raising funds for suspect charities 
or jihadi causes; indications of 
individuals or small groups seeking 
inroads to the Global Jihad; changes in 
neighbor behavior indicative resulting in 
significant shift in political or religious 
views, or noticeable change in an 
individual’s circle of friends (particularly 






The emergence of radical elements may 
suggest the early formation of pro-jihadi or 
actual jihadi cliques, or possibly even 
terrorist cells.  Changes in individuals’ 
associations and social habits may also 







                                                 
224 In this context, mukhtar’s community services or the community’s general support structure 
constitute the resource. 
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Mosque congregant information, community activities, signs of radical newcomers or 
emergent radical elements, identification of radical imams at other mosques, 









Emergence or arrival of vocal, radical 
elements; emergence of Salafist cliques; 
scheduled visits in the area by outspoken, 
radical speakers or imams; approaches by 
people raising funds for suspect charities 
or jihadi causes; indications of 
individuals or small groups seeking 
inroads to the Global Jihad; changes in a 
congregant’s behavior indicative resulting 
in significant shift in political or religious 
views (such as increased piety or 
devoutness), or noticeable change in an 





The emergence of radical elements may 
suggest the earlier formation of pro-jihadi or 
actual jihadi cliques, or possibly even 
terrorist cells.  Individual shifts in piety may 
point to a growing Salafi influence in the 
congregation.  Changes in individuals’ 
associations and social habits may also 





                                                 



































Emergence or arrival of vocal, radical 
elements; emergence of Salafist cliques; 
scheduled visits in the area by outspoken, 
radical speakers or imams; appeals by 
people raising funds for suspect charities 
or jihadi causes; indications of 
individuals or small groups seeking 
inroads to the Global Jihad; changes in a 
congregant’s behavior indicative resulting 
in significant shift in political or religious 
views (such as increased piety or 
devoutness), or noticeable change in an 
individual’s circle of friends. 
 
Noticeable radicalism in the mosque 
clergy, or the arrival of new imams with 
pro-jihadi views.   
 
Power struggles in the mosque between 




The emergence of radical elements may 
suggest the earlier formation of pro-jihadi or 
actual jihadi cliques, or possibly even 
terrorist cells.  Individual shifts in piety may 
point to a growing Salafi influence in the 
congregation.  Changes in individuals’ 
associations and social habits may also 
suggest newfound membership in a Salafi 






Radicalism in the clergy may incline the 
mosque and congregation to support jihadi 
causes and operatives. 
 
In-fighting among the clergy may point to 
external elements attempting to usurp the 
mosque to use as a jihadi base.226 
 
 
                                                 
226 This is what happened at the Alkifah Center in Brooklyn, when the blind sheikh, Omar Abdel 
Rahman precipitated a radical takeover after his arrival in 1990. See Posner, pp. 7-10. 
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Potential Source:        Medical Supplier, Scientific Equipment Supplier, or  



























Destination for medical or scientific 
equipment is not an educational or 
scientific institution, but a private 
residence or post office box. 
 
An apparently devout Muslim 
(particularly one dressed and groomed in 
Salafi manner) purchasing beer-brewing 







The purchase may be for distillation of 












Open Contact or 
Confidential Informant 
(Confidential Informant if 

























Suspect filling prescriptions for large 
quantities of powerful antibiotics.   
 
Prescription may be written by an out-of-
town physician, an apparently foreign or 
immigrant physician, or physician new to 




Note: Suspect may fill multiple, small-
quantity prescriptions at different 
pharmacies to avoid detection.  Detection 
of such “pharmacy shopping” requires 






Suspect may be working on culturing 
















Potential Source:        Transportation System Employees  




























Photographing or videotaping entryways 
and exits; security measures and 
personnel; crowds and traffic patterns.  
Emphasis on capturing signs identifying a 
station or a particular office is 







May be a target casing.  Taking special note 
of distinct markings or signs that identify the 
asset suggests an attempt to highlight the 
means by which a subsequent planning team 
or attack team may recognize the specific 




































Patron expresses interest in blueprints, 
architectural designs, or structural data 
for the facility.  
 
Photographing or videotaping entryways 
and exits; security measures and 






May be an attempt to case the facility for an 
attack, with designs on finding access points 
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APPENDIX C.  AUTOMATIC ANALYTICS: FROM FIELD REPORT 
TO DATABASE 
A patrolman cited a driver and passenger for littering on Tuesday.  She observed 
the subjects pull up to the curb in front of the federal courthouse at 4:06 p.m., toss a 
brown paper bag from the passenger window onto the courthouse steps, and drive away.  
The officer pulled them over at the end of the block and issued a ticket for littering.  She 
also went back to retrieve the paper bag, which contained a wad of modeling clay 
weighing approximately three pounds. 
The officer’s report lists the subjects’ names, passport information, the name of 
the hotel where they are staying, and pertinent rental car information.  It also includes the 
time and location of the incident with a brief synopsis. 
An analyst then processes the field report for entry into the automated database.  
He feeds different data fields in the system drawn from the information the officer 
recorded during the traffic stop.  The analyst must also apply some of his own training 
and interpret the event.  Was it a simple littering offense?  Did the time and location have 
some significance?  Perhaps federal court cases recess around 4 p.m.—about the time of 
this incident.  Three pounds of modeling clay is an odd thing to toss out of a car window; 
an empty fast food bag or Styrofoam coffee cup would be more common.  This 
anomalous behavior, combined with the location, suggests to the analyst this might be a 
dry run, or rehearsal, for a possible hand-tossed explosive device attack.   
The analyst must select the appropriate activity categories in the database, such as 
rehearsal.  All the other data go into the appropriate data fields.  Once the analyst has 
entered all the available data, the system can begin the automated analytic evaluation. 
The system should ideally cross-reference multiple databases to find connections 
to the data elements in the police analytic database.  This process identifies another 
individual from the same country who rented a car from the same rental agency and 
stayed in the same hotel one month earlier.  Though his name isn’t in the police analytic 
database (having not been cited for any offense), cross-referencing hotel and rental car 
databases turned up his name. Federal court dockets list a terrorism indictment hearing 
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scheduled at that courthouse on a Tuesday next month.  A captured terrorist suspect 
happens to be the government’s prime witness. 
The computerized analytic system may note the commonalities, whereupon the 
analyst can recommend a collection plan for further intelligence gathering.  Police may 
stake out the area around the courthouse to observe pre-operational surveillance or dry 
run activity.  Over the next month, their observations help the analyst feed the database 
with vehicle descriptions, license plate numbers, incident times and activity details.  The 
system crunches the data and shows a pattern of similar activity on various days of the 
week around 4 p.m., with increasing frequency as the court date gets closer—and there is 
at least one apparent dry run every Tuesday.  The predictive result is that an attack is 
possible against people exiting the courthouse following the terrorism indictment hearing, 
perhaps more specifically against the terrorist who turned state’s evidence. 
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APPENDIX D.  MULTI-MATRIX METHOD: EXAMPLE 
ASSESSMENT 
A hypothetical example of the multi-matrix risk assessment method follows.   
 
Step 1: Build Terrorist Attack Strategy Model  
 
The security planners practice Red Teaming to build a terrorist targeting strategy 
model for al-Qa’eda and its affiliates.  They glean intelligence reports and consult 
analysts to devise the model, which gives them their baseline planning assumptions. 
 
Primary Terrorist Threat - The primary terrorist threat of concern is from 
transnational Islamist terrorists affiliated with the Global Jihad, namely al-Qa’eda and its 
affiliates.  
Predominant Transnational Islamist Terrorist Method of Operations (MO) – 
• Plan mass casualty attacks 
• Mass gatherings at special events 
• Tourist attractions (e.g., Bali, Indonesia bombing in 2002 and 
2005; Jordan plots in 1999; Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt bombings in 
2005) 
• Hotels - popular target based on current trend in East Asia (e.g., 
Jakarta, Indonesia bombing 2003) the Middle East and Africa (e.g., 
Amman, Jordan plot in 1999 and attacks in 2005; Mombassa, 
Kenya attack in 2002; attack in Casablanca, Morocco in 2003; 
bombings in Taba and Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt  in 2004 and 2005 
respectively) 
• Mass transit (e.g., Madrid, Spain train bombing in 2004, London, 
U.K. metro and bus attacks in 2005227) 
                                                 
227 Al-Qa’eda’s affiliation with the cells that perpetrated the Madrid and London attacks remains a 
matter of debate, as the financial, operational and inspirational links have not been firmly established.  
Whether the groups acted on behalf of al-Qa’eda, or merely followed al-Qa’eda’s jihadi model, the 
resultant attacks did fit the mass casualty and multi-target paradigm. 
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• Conduct simultaneous attacks against multiple targets228 (e.g., U.S. 
embassies in Africa, 1998; 11 September, 2001; Madrid and London rail 
attacks) Note: This is only a partially a relevant factor in local analysis, 
since the multiple attacks can be separated over great geographic distances 
for effect, rather than concentrating as multiple attacks within one locality.  
A centrally directed al-Qa’eda operation may attack targets in different 
states or different countries, while an affiliated grass-roots jihadi cell may 
only be capable of striking multiple targets within the same city. 
• Prefer perceived hard targets (embassies, military assets overseas), but 
trend toward soft, high-profile targets (e.g., U.S. embassies in Africa were 
more vulnerable than  diplomatic  facilities in more dangerous 
countries;229 The USS Cole and USS The Sullivans were transiting, not 
moored in a naval port)   
• Prefer vehicle-borne explosive devices, such as trucks, boats or aircraft 
(e.g., U.S. embassies in Africa; Bali in 2002 and 2005; 2000 attempt on 
the USS The Sullivans and attack on the USS Cole in Aden, Yemen; 11 
September 2001.) 
• Expressed desire for weapons of mass destruction, but no successful 
attacks to date (some plans have been foiled or interdicted)230   
• Expressed desire for economic impact,231 though rarely the primary focus 
of attack  
 
Step 2: List Assets to Protect  
 
 Next, the planners compile a list of assets they wish to protect from terrorist 
attack: 
 
• Grand Hotel on the Boardwalk 
• Subway Train System 
• Nuclear Power Plant 




                                                 
228 Bruce Teft, “Terrorism Awareness—Islamic Terrorism: Origins and Prevention,” International 
Counter-Terrorism Officers [sic] Association 3rd Annual Conference, Orlando, FL, lecture, 18 October 
2005. 
229 “FBI leads bombing investigation; security warnings reviewed,” CNN.com, 13 August 1998, 
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/africa/9808/13/embassy.fbi.03/ (accessed 21 May 2006). 
230 Teft. 
231 Teft, citing bin Laden’s 29 October 2001 statement on the 9/11 attacks. 
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Step 3: Calculate Severity of Terrorist Events 
 
The planners assume a high-explosive device as the preferred method to 
maximize carnage (as derived from the attack model).  Specifically, they surmise the 
attack on the Grand Hotel would take the form of a truck bomb (worst case).  They 
postulate a subway attack would consist of multiple backpack charges placed by 
pedestrian terrorists, or explosive vests detonated by suicide bombers.  The most effective 
means to get an explosive onto the nuclear power plant would be by means of a small, 
explosive-laden aircraft.  Finally, they hypothesize either a vehicle bomb outside the 
building, or pedestrian bombers inside, would be the most effective means to attack the 
public library.  The planners then rate each potential target against each criterion in the 








Figure 20 Example Severity Matrix Calculation 
 
Step 4: Calculate Probability of Attack 
 
The planners evaluate an attack against each asset in light of the terrorist MO, 
terrorist capabilities, and the asset’s vulnerabilities to the anticipated form of attack (see 













Step 5: Calculate Risk  
 
The planners’ final step entails inputting the Severity Matrix and Probability 
Matrix results into the Risk Assessment Matrix for each asset in turn.  (See Figure 23.)  
The tool generates a risk assessment for each asset relative to the others.  
 
Figure 23 Example Risk Assessment Matrix Calculation 
 
The Multi-Matrix Methodology produces a three-way tie between the Grand 
Hotel, subway and power plant for risk.  Planner may break the tie based on relative 
severity rankings or probability rankings.  The hotel and subway are more likely to be 
struck than the power plant, though the resultant severity of an attack on the power plant 
brings the risk on par with the other two targets.  If planner elects to harden targets based 
on the likelihood they will be attacked, they would do well to fortify the hotel first, then 
the subway.  If they choose to prioritize the three targets based on the consequences of an 
attack, then they should harden the power plant. 
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